New Jersey Anti-SLAPP Laws Acts UPEPA

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2A:53A-49 Short title.

1. This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Uniform Public Expression Protection Act ."

2A:53A-50 Definitions; scope.

2. Scope.

a. In this section:

(1) "Goods or services" does not include the creation, dissemination, exhibition, or advertisement or similar promotion of a dramatic, literary, musical, political, journalistic, or artistic work.

(2) "Governmental unit" means a public corporation or government or governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality.

(3) "Person" means an individual, estate, trust, partnership, business or nonprofit entity, governmental unit, or other legal entity.

b. Except as otherwise provided in subsection c., this act applies to a cause of action asserted in a civil action against a person based on the person's:

(1) communication in a legislative, executive, judicial, administrative, or other governmental proceeding;

(2) communication on an issue under consideration or review in a legislative, executive, judicial, administrative, or other governmental proceeding; or

(3) exercise of the right of freedom of speech or of the press, the right to assembly or petition, or the right of association, guaranteed by the United States Constitution or the New Jersey Constitution, on a matter of public concern.

c. This act does not apply to a cause of action asserted:

(1) against a governmental unit or an employee or agent of a governmental unit acting or purporting to act in an official capacity;

(2) by a governmental unit or an employee or agent of a governmental unit acting in an official capacity to enforce a law to protect against an imminent threat to public health or safety; or

(3) against a person primarily engaged in the business of selling or leasing goods or services if the cause of action arises out of a communication related to the person's sale or lease of the goods or services.

2A:53A-51 Order, show cause.

3. Order to Show Cause.

Not later than 60 days after a party is served with a petition or complaint, crossclaim, counterclaim, third-party claim, or other pleading that asserts a cause of action to which this act applies or at a later time on a showing of good cause, the party may file an application for an order to show cause with the court to dismiss the cause of action or part of the cause of action.

2A:53A-52 Court, order, stay.

4. Stay.

a. Except as otherwise provided in subsections d. through g., upon the filing of an application for an order to show cause under section 3 of P.L.2023, c.155 (C.2A:53A-51) the court may order:

(1) all other proceedings between the moving party and responding party, including discovery and a pending hearing or motion, to be stayed;

(2) on motion by the moving party, the court may stay an action or proceeding involving another party, or discovery by another party, if the hearing or ruling in that proceeding would adjudicate, or the discovery would relate to, an issue material to an order to show cause under section 3 of P.L.2023, c.155 (C.2A:53A-51); and

(3) In determining whether to stay any proceedings, there shall be a presumption that such a stay shall be granted.

b. A stay under subsection a. remains in effect until lifted by the court.

c. Except as otherwise provided in subsections e., f. and g., if a party appeals from an order ruling on an order to show cause under section 3 of P.L.2023, c.155 (C.2A:53A-51), all proceedings between all parties in the action may be stayed by the court until the conclusion of the appeal.

d. During a stay under subsection a., the court may allow limited discovery if a party shows that specific information is necessary to establish whether a party has satisfied or failed to satisfy a burden under subsection a. of section 7 of P.L.2023, c.155 (C.2A:53A-55) and the information is not reasonably available unless discovery is allowed.

e. A motion under section 10 of P.L.2023, c.155 (C.2A:53A-58) for costs, attorney's fees, and expenses is not subject to a stay under this section.

f. A stay under this section does not affect a party's ability voluntarily to dismiss a cause of action or party of a cause of action or move to sever a cause of action.

g. If the court issues a stay under this section, the court for good cause may hear and rule on:

(1) a motion unrelated to an order to show cause under section 3 of P.L.2023, c.155 (C.2A:53A-51); and

(2) a motion seeking a special or preliminary injunction to protect against an imminent threat to public health or safety.

2A:53A-53 Hearing.

5. Hearing.

a. The court shall hear an order to show cause under section 3 of P.L.2023, c.155 (C.2A:53A-51) as expeditiously as possible.

b. If the Court allows for discovery under subsection d. of section 4 of P.L.2023, c.155 (C.2A:53A-52), the court shall hear the order to show cause under section 3 of P.L.2023, c.155 (C.2A:53A-51) as soon as practicable after the conclusion of time set forth in its order permitting limited discovery pursuant to subsection d. of section 4 of P.L.2023, c.155 (C.2A:53A-52).

2A:53A-54 Proof.

6. Proof.

In ruling on an order to show cause under section 3 of P.L.2023, c.155 (C.2A:53A-51), the court may consider the pleadings, the order to show cause application and supporting certifications, briefs, any reply or response to the order to show cause, and any evidence that could be considered in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.

2A:53A-55 Cause of action, dismissal, whole, part.

7. Dismissal of cause of action in whole or part.

a. In ruling on an order to show cause under section 3 of P.L.2023, c.155 (C.2A:53A-51), the court shall dismiss with prejudice a cause of action, or part of a cause of action, if:

(1) the moving party established under subsection b. of section 2 of P.L.2023, c.155 (C.2A:53A-50) that this act applies;

(2) the responding party fails to establish under subsection c. of section 2 of P.L.2023, c.155 (C.2A:53A-50) that this act does not apply; and

(3) either:

(a) the responding party fails to establish a prima facie case as to each essential element of any cause of action in the complaint; or

(b) the moving party establishes that:

(i) the responding party failed to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted; or

(ii) there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the cause of action or part of the cause of action.

b. A voluntary dismissal without prejudice of a responding party's cause of action, or part of a cause of action, that is the subject of an order to show cause under section 3 of P.L.2023, c.155 (C.2A:53A-51) does not affect a moving party's right to obtain a ruling on the order to show cause and seek costs, attorney's fees, and expenses under section 10 of P.L.2023, c.155 (C.2A:53A-58).

c. A voluntary dismissal with prejudice of a responding's party cause of action, or part of a cause of action, that is the subject of an order to show cause under section 3 of P.L.2023, c.155 (C.2A:53A-51) establishes for the purpose of section 10 of P.L.2023, c.155 (C.2A:53A-58) that the moving party prevailed on the motion.

2A:53A-56 Ruling.

8. Ruling.

The court shall rule on an order to show cause under section 3 of P.L.2023, c.155 (C.2A:53A-51) as soon as practicable after a hearing under section 5 of P.L.2023, c.155 (C.2A:53A-53).

2A:53A-57 Appeal.

9. Appeal.

A moving party may appeal as a matter of right from an order denying, in whole or in part, an order to show cause under section 3 of P.L.2023, c.155 (C.2A:53A-51). The appeal must be filed not later than 20 days after entry of the order.

2A:53A-58 Costs, attorney's fees, expenses.

10. Costs, Attorney's Fees, and Expenses.

On a motion under section 3 of P.L.2023, c.155 (C.2A:53A-51), the court shall award court costs, reasonable attorney's fees, and reasonable litigation expenses related to the order to show cause:

(1) to the moving party if the moving party prevails on the order to show cause; or

(2) to the responding party if the responding party prevails on the order to show cause and the court finds that the order to show cause was frivolous or filed solely with intent to delay the proceeding.

2A:53A-59 Construction.

11. Construction.

This act shall be broadly construed and applied to protect the exercise of the right of freedom of speech and of the press, the right to assembly and petition, and the right of association, guaranteed by the United States Constitution or the New Jersey Constitution.

2A:53A-60 Application, construction uniformity.

12. Uniformity of Application and Construction.

In applying and construing this uniform act, consideration must be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.

2A:53A-61 Severability.

13. Severability.

If any provision of this act or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of this act which can be given effect with the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are severable.

New Jersey Opinions

Holtec Int'l v. Javerbaum Wurgaft, 2026 WL 2014782 (N.J.Super.App., July 13, 2026).

♦ The New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of Holtec International’s defamation complaint against the Javerbaum law firm under the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA). The litigation stemmed from Javerbaum’s representation of Holtec’s former CFO in a wrongful termination suit. Javerbaum posted a website article summarizing the lawsuit, stating the CFO was fired for refusing to submit "false financial statements" to investors. Holtec sued for defamation, arguing the underlying document was merely an investment prospectus containing projections. Applying New Jersey's anti-SLAPP statute (UPEPA), the appellate court first determined that the law firm’s speech involved a matter of public concern, given Holtec’s status as a major entity in the highly regulated nuclear reactor industry. Second, the court held that UPEPA’s commercial speech exemption did not apply; construing the statutory exemption narrowly, the court found the website post was informational commentary on a pending case rather than direct advertising soliciting the sale of legal services. Finally, the court concluded Holtec failed to establish a prima facie defamation claim. Javerbaum’s use of the phrase "false financial statements" accurately captured the gist of the CFO's complaint regarding misleading financial projections, thereby shielding the firm under the fair-report privilege. Furthermore, because the speech addressed a matter of public concern, Holtec was required to demonstrate actual malice by clear and convincing evidence. The court ruled that Holtec’s bare allegations, relying solely on Javerbaum’s refusal to retract the post or remove a link to a related news article, were insufficient to prove actual malice, justifying the complaint's dismissal with prejudice. ♦

Town of Dover v. Gonzalez, 2026 WL 1532353 (N.J.Super.App., May 21, 2026).

♦ The Appellate Division of New Jersey vacated a trial court order dismissing Richard Gonzalez’s counterclaim under the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA) and remanded for further proceedings. Gonzalez, a former Dover police sergeant, had settled earlier federal employment claims in 2015 in exchange for $175,000 and agreed to a non-disparagement clause barring negative comments about the town and related officials and employees. Years later, after Gonzalez posted harsh social media criticism of Dover officials and employees on matters including alleged misconduct and misuse of public funds, the town sued for breach of contract and obtained preliminary injunctive relief. The trial court later dismissed Gonzalez’s UPEPA counterclaim, reasoning that by agreeing to the clause he had waived protection for the speech at issue. The Appellate Division disagreed, holding that UPEPA broadly covers claims based on protected speech on matters of public concern and contains no categorical exception for speech subject to a non-disparagement provision. The court did not decide whether Gonzalez ultimately prevails under UPEPA, but directed the remand court to determine whether the town can state and support a viable breach-of-contract claim, interpret the scope and meaning of the non-disparagement provision, consider whether any waiver of constitutional rights was knowing and voluntary, and evaluate public policy and unconstitutional-conditions arguments. The court expressed no view on the ultimate outcome. ♦

Lento Law Group, PC v. Hendrickson, 2026 WL 1725344 (June 15, 2026).

♦ The New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of a law firm’s defamation complaint against a former client under the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA). After paying a $5,000 non-refundable retainer for a legal matter that settled quickly, defendant Carly Hendrickson posted a one-star review on the Better Business Bureau website, calling the firm a "total rip off" and criticizing its refusal to issue a partial refund. Lento Law sued for defamation and tortious interference, but the trial court dismissed the action under UPEPA and awarded Hendrickson attorney’s fees and costs. On appeal, Lento Law challenged only the defamation dismissal, arguing the trial court incorrectly applied the Rule 4:6-2(e) motion to dismiss standard rather than the summary judgment standard, and erred in finding the post non-defamatory. The Appellate Division rejected both arguments. First, the court held that the plain, unambiguous language of UPEPA explicitly authorizes trial courts to dismiss meritless SLAPP suits using either a summary judgment or a motion to dismiss standard, furthering the statute’s goal of promptly protecting free speech. Second, the court determined the BBB review addressed a matter of public concern—specifically, consumer information regarding a law firm's billing practices in the "public square." Applying defamation principles, the court concluded Lento Law failed to state an actionable claim because Hendrickson’s post did not contain false, verifiable factual assertions. Instead, her comments constituted protected subjective opinion, rhetorical hyperbole, and expressions of dissatisfaction with the firm's non-refundable retainer policy, without accusing the firm of illegal conduct. Furthermore, the court noted that the complaint lacked specific factual allegations demonstrating actual malice. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the complaint’s dismissal with prejudice for failing to state a claim. ♦

Wunsch v. CTE Republicans For Englewood Cliffs, 2026 WL 60327 (N.J.Super.App.Div., Jan. 8, 2026).

♦ In Wunsch v. CTE Republicans For Englewood Cliffs, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, affirmed the trial court’s denial of defendants’ motion to dismiss a defamation action under the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA). Plaintiff Albert Wunsch, III, a borough attorney, filed suit against a local Republican committee and several candidates regarding campaign flyers and emails alleging he was the "De facto Mayor," engaged in corruption, and was "Paid $800K+ TAXPAYER MONEY TO SELL US OUT." Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint and sought attorney fees pursuant to UPEPA, arguing the statements were protected political speech. While the court acknowledged UPEPA applied to the speech, it upheld the trial court's determination that the plaintiff had sufficiently pleaded the elements of defamation to survive dismissal. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's exercise of discretion under N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-52(d) to permit limited discovery regarding publication, actual malice, and damages, reasoning that critical facts concerning the defendants' state of mind and participation were within their exclusive knowledge. Furthermore, the court rejected the defendants' argument that the materials contained only non-actionable opinions, holding that the accusations of bribery and criminal behavior contained specific factual assertions capable of being proven false. Consequently, the court affirmed the orders denying the dismissal and fee applications, allowing the defamation case to proceed. ♦

Paucek v. Shaulis, 2025 WL 1298457 (D.N.J., May 6, 2025).

♦ Plaintiffs Christopher Paucek and Pro Athlete Community, Inc. (PAC) sued blogger Dahn Shaulis for defamation and tortious interference. Shaulis sought dismissal under New Jersey's anti-SLAPP statute (UPEPA) and attorney's fees. The court addressed two threshold questions. First, the court held that while some UPEPA provisions (e.g., heightened dismissal standards, discovery stays, interlocutory appeals) conflict with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules 12 and 56) and thus do not apply in federal court, UPEPA's mandatory fee-shifting provision does apply. This is because the fee-shifting is triggered if a defendant successfully dismisses the complaint under the non-conflicting Rule 12 or Rule 56 standards. The court reasoned that fee-shifting is a substantive state law, and UPEPA's severability clause allows for the application of its non-conflicting parts. The fee request, however, cannot be asserted as a counterclaim. Second, the court determined that New Jersey law governs the underlying claims. Applying New Jersey's choice-of-law rules, the court found a conflict between New Jersey, Maryland (Paucek's domicile), and Delaware (PAC's alleged principal place of business). Despite the presumptive rule favoring the plaintiff's domicile/principal place of business, the court applied New Jersey law. This was due to New Jersey's "most significant relationship" to the case, particularly its strong public policy interest in its broad anti-SLAPP law, the defendant's New Jersey domicile, and the origin of the alleged defamatory statements in New Jersey. ♦

Satz v. Keset Starr, 2025 WL 1522032 (N.J.App., May 29, 2025).

♦ The N.J. Appellate Division addressed whether a plaintiff's voluntary dismissal of a lawsuit prevents defendants from seeking attorney's fees under the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA), New Jersey's anti-SLAPP law. Plaintiff Allen J. Satz sued defendants for $30 million over a flyer related to a religious divorce. Defendants sought dismissal and fees under UPEPA, arguing the suit targeted protected speech. Satz then voluntarily dismissed his complaint. The trial court denied defendants' subsequent motion for UPEPA fees, mistakenly believing the dismissal precluded it and confusing UPEPA's standard with frivolous litigation. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that UPEPA explicitly allows defendants to pursue fees even after a voluntary dismissal (N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-55(b)). This prevents a "loophole" where SLAPP plaintiffs could avoid liability by strategically dismissing their cases. The court remanded, directing the trial judge to hear the defendants' UPEPA motion for fees and costs. ♦