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Lichfield v. Kubler, 2025 WL 2772468 (D.Utah, Sep. 29, 2025).

Opinion 2025 Utah Prima_Facie_Viability Opinion2025LichfieldUtahPrimaFaciaValidity

Related Article: None.

AI Synopsis

♦ This opinion is centered on Lichfield’s claims that the Netflix documentary "The Program: Cons, Cults, and Kidnapping," created by Kubler, defamed him and portrayed him in a false light by discussing alleged abuses in troubled teen programs and highlighting his role in the industry; however, the court dismissed all claims—including defamation, defamation per se, false light, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy—because the statements in the documentary were found to be constitutionally protected opinions or rhetorical hyperbole, not actionable facts, the juxtaposition of Lichfield’s image with a news article headline did not imply defamatory meaning, the statement about his arrest in Costa Rica was true (and truth is an absolute defense), and allegations that he was portrayed as a “mastermind” were too vague, with the court further finding that the false light and emotional distress claims failed for the same reasons as the defamation claims and the conduct was not outrageous enough for IIED, while the civil conspiracy claim failed because the underlying torts were dismissed; ultimately, the court also awarded attorney fees and costs to the defendants as required by the Anti-SLAPP statutes. ♦

Lichfield v. Kubler, 183 F.4th 1248 (10th Cir., July 27, 27, 2026).

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

Narvin LICHFIELD, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

Katherine KUBLER; Netflix, Inc., Defendants - Appellees.

No. 25-4135

FILED July 27, 2026

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Utah (D.C. No. 2:24-CV-00458-JNP-CMR)

Attorneys and Law Firms

Ross P. Meyer of Enara Law, Scottsdale, Arizona (Michael K. Hepworth of Hepworth Legal, Bountiful, Utah, on the briefs) for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Natalie J. Spears of Dentons US LLP, Chicago, Illinois (David W. Tufts and Ian M. Kinghorn of Dentons Durham Jones Pinegar P.C., Salt Lake City, Utah; Gregory R. Naron and Jacqueline A. Domenella of Dentons US LLP, Chicago, Illinois, with her on the brief) for Defendants-Appellees.

Before TYMKOVICH, BACHARACH, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges.

Opinion

FEDERICO, Circuit Judge.

PAGE__1252

Narvin Lichfield operated boarding schools and programs for purportedly “troubled teens” for more than three decades. During this time, these boarding schools – as well as the broader industry – drew attention from the public and press for allegations of extreme disciplinary PAGE__1253 techniques that allegedly crossed the line into physical and mental abuse. Katherine Kubler is a filmmaker who, as a teenager, spent fifteen months at a facility for troubled teens that billed itself as a high school (even though it was not accredited to award diplomas). While she was enrolled, Kubler swore that she would one day get revenge by making a documentary about her experience.

Kubler did ultimately create a documentary about her boarding school. The documentary took the form of a three-part series that also discussed the larger troubled-teen industry. So, although he did not supervise or direct the school Kubler attended, Lichfield was featured during one episode for his affiliation with an industry organization and other schools for troubled teens. Netflix produced the documentary and streamed it on its platform. When Lichfield sued Kubler for defamation, he also named Netflix as a Defendant. The district court dismissed Lichfield's complaint because it failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted. He appealed to this court.

This dispute, then, brings into conflict two sets of values honored by our legal system. On the one hand, Lichfield seeks recompense for what he alleges is unlawful defamation of his character. But, on the other hand, Kubler and Netflix seek refuge in their free-speech rights to make and distribute a film about a topic of public importance. Determining the boundary between these competing interests – free speech versus defamation – is the topic of this appeal. In the end, we agree with the district court and affirm.

I

A

Long before Kubler entered the world of professional filmmaking, she was a troubled high-school student. During her teenage years, she “started acting out,” by drinking, smoking, and sneaking out at night. The Program: Cons Cults and Kidnapping, Part 1: Where the F*** Am I?! at 6:37 (Netflix 2024) (hereinafter The Program) (on file with the Clerk's Office). fn1 As Kubler tells it, she was engaged in “typical teenager stuff” related to a fraught relationship with her stepmother. Id. Kubler begged her father to send her “somewhere, anywhere” away from her stepmother. Id. at 6:45. Then, midway through her sophomore year, Kubler transferred to a private religious boarding school. After a few months, the boarding school expelled her for violating its alcohol policy.

fn1. Because this case comes to us on appeal of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, we accept as true the well-pleaded facts of the operative complaint. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Throughout the Amended Complaint, Lichfield references The Program, and its precise content is central to his claims. The parties do not dispute the authenticity of the recording that has been filed with the Clerk's Office and ask that we treat it as incorporated into the Amended Complaint by reference. Consistent with our jurisprudence, we will do so. Brokers’ Choice of Am., Inc. v. NBC Universal, Inc., 861 F.3d 1081, 1103 (10th Cir. 2017).

Following her expulsion, Kubler waited in the principal's office for her father's arrival. Instead, two strangers arrived with handcuffs. Kubler's father had hired them without her knowledge to escort her to a new school: Academy at Ivy Ridge (Ivy Ridge). Soon after her arrival, Kubler learned Ivy Ridge was not a typical high school. She was strip searched for contraband upon her arrival at campus. She would not be free to come and go. And, until she could prove her good standing, she could not call her parents on the phone.

PAGE__1254

Good standing could be earned through compliance with a multitudinous list of rules that included prohibitions on talking to other students, making eye contact, and looking out the window. The restroom could only be used under the supervision of the staff. Compliance with the rules could earn students “upper-level privileges,” which permitted them to talk to their peers, wear makeup, and look out the window. Id. at 16:00. When students earned enough points to progress through the various levels, they could finally leave the program.

Ivy Ridge was not a freestanding program. It was affiliated with the World Wide Association of Specialty Programs and Schools (WWASP). WWASP itself is no stranger to controversy; it has come under public scrutiny in connection with allegations of abuse and neglect at affiliated institutions. See, e.g., World Wide Ass'n of Specialty Programs v. Pure, Inc., 450 F.3d 1132, 1135–36 (10th Cir. 2006) (detailing news reports). It was also highly profitable, in part due to steep attendance fees and relatively low expenses. And, by Kubler's telling, Narvin Lichfield – whose brother, Robert, founded WWASP – was instrumental in building WWASP into an “empire of troubled teen programs.” The Program, Part 3: Follow the Money at 24:43. The dispute now before this Court is predicated on the character and truthfulness of statements made about Lichfield's involvement with WWASP and several facilities connected with it.

Kubler, for her part, never completed the program at Ivy Ridge or earned a high-school diploma. Instead, her father pulled her out of Ivy Ridge after fifteen months. By then, Kubler's relationship with her father was severely damaged. In an attempt to get her “big revenge” against the school's staff, The Program, Part 1 at 27:15, through which she might “get all this evidence together” about her experience “and present it to [her] dad,” The Program, Part 2: Mind Control at 27:51; accord The Program, Part 3, at 50:10, Kubler made a documentary about Ivy Ridge and schools like it, The Program Part 1 at 27:15, 27:47. The series that Kubler directed and produced, and that Netflix also produced, contains the speech that eventually led to Lichfield's lawsuit.

The series’ three episodes are built around and filtered through Kubler's personal experience as a child at home and at Ivy Ridge. The first episode, titled Part 1: Where the F*** Am I?!, displays home video footage while describing Kubler's personal conflict with her “evil stepmother” and her transfer to Ivy Ridge. The Program, Part 1 at 6:30. Kubler later reunites with other students on Ivy Ridge's abandoned campus, where they detail their experiences of physical and sexual abuse at the now-defunct high school. At one point, Kubler opens a Mike's Hard Lemonade alcoholic beverage – possession of which got her sent to Ivy Ridge so many years ago – before wandering the empty halls.

In Part 2: Mind Control, Kubler again roams the Ivy Ridge campus holding a Mike's Hard Lemonade. The narrative focus, though, shifts to “seminars” at Ivy Ridge that served as the purported backbone of the program. The Program, Part 2 at 2:00. Two of Kubler's classmates describe a session in which they were required to repeat an eight-word mantra with associated hand movements for eight hours uninterrupted. The narrator describes these techniques as tantamount to “literal brainwashing,” handed down to the “troubled teen industry” from a 1960s-era cult. Id. at 8:57, 9:50, 12:09. Over the course of the episode Kubler interviews a friend's parent, sneaks into a seminar for parents of WWASP students, and confronts PAGE__1255 a former public relations coordinator for Ivy Ridge. The episode culminates with a scene in which Kubler confronts her father about her “complicated feelings” stemming from her time at Ivy Ridge. Id. at 53:40, 55:07. Prior to the confrontation, Kubler had not seen her father in person for years. In the scene, her father apologizes for sending her away to Ivy Ridge.

The first two episodes of the series are important for context, but it is the content of Part 3: Follow the Money that is central to this legal dispute. The episode begins with one of the series’ recurrent tropes: the camera displays a bulletin board to which photos, news clippings, and paper documents have been affixed by thumb tacks. The Program, Part 3 at 00:18. As the camera cuts between different portions of the bulletin board, Kubler narrates:

It bothers me how people low on the totem pole end up taking the fall. And the people at the top seem to get away with murder. I knew if I really wanted to go after these places, I'd need to follow the money.

Id.

Then, as Kubler concludes her remarks, the camera cuts to a wider shot, in which a silhouetted person – apparently Kubler – stands in front of the bulletin board and its array of images, newspaper clippings, and a map of the United States, with string connecting various items. Id. at 00:32. Most notable for this appeal, though, is the frame shown when Kubler references “people at the top” seeming to “get away with murder.” See id. at 00:27. At that moment, the camera rests on a newspaper clipping from the Salt Lake Tribune headlined “As Therapy Hikes Reviewed, Another Teen Dies in Program.” Id. Next to this clipping is an image of a man who has not yet appeared in the series. See id. That man is the Plaintiff-Appellant, Narvin Lichfield. A screenshot of this moment in the record is reproduced below.

_[Image omitted.]

Id.

This image – along with the corresponding statement – comprises the first scene or segment of the series that Lichfield challenges in this appeal as defamatory. By his theory, the juxtaposition of the visuals and narration falsely implies that he is responsible for a teen's death.

The second challenged segment appears midway through the episode. Shortly before it is introduced, Kubler is engaged in an interview with Lichfield's estranged PAGE__1256 son, who describes his father's decision to open a school in Costa Rica named Dundee. Id. at 30:20. Kubler then narrates: “Dundee was only open for nineteen months before authorities were alerted to abuse, raided the facility, and Narvin was arrested.” Id. at 30:36. The series displays a clip from an episode of the TV program Inside Edition contemporaneous to the arrest in which Lichfield told a local news reporter: “We haven't done anything here but try to run a school.” Id. at 30:43. Kubler, again narrating, says: “Narvin didn't waste any time in rebuilding his Costa Rican facility into a new program called Pillars of Hope, only seven months after his previous program was raided.” Id. at 30:53. Although Lichfield concedes that the facility was raided and he was arrested, he contends on appeal that this segment is defamatory because it fails to mention that Costa Rican authorities ultimately dismissed the criminal charges against him.

The third challenged segment is prefaced by a screenshot of Lichfield's social media post inviting his Instagram followers to join him on a Wednesday night to sing karaoke. Id. at 47:33. The image then cuts to Kubler drinking from a pint glass at the karaoke bar while Lichfield takes the stage to sing “Witchcraft” as performed by Frank Sinatra. Id. at 47:39. Lichfield dances side to side, and an audio track of Kubler's narration plays:

It was surreal to see Narvin in person, knowing everything I know about this guy: the children he abused, the parents he conned, all the crimes he's gotten away with. Yet, here he is – free as a bird, singing Frank Sinatra at a club in Utah. I didn't talk to him because I didn't want to blow my cover. And I don't like giving abusers a platform to spew their bullshit.

Id. at 48:04.

The narration fades away, Lichfield returns to his seat, and Kubler drinks from a shot glass chased with lime before running to the stage. Id. at 48:30. Kubler narrates: “Unlike the Justice Department or FBI, there's nothing I can really do to the Lichfields, except this. But don't get too comfortable Narvin. ‘Cuz one way or another, I'm gonna get you.’ ” Id. at 48:42. She and two friends then perform an off-key version of Blondie's “One Way or Another” while Lichfield looks on bemused. fn2 Id. at 48:55. On appeal, Lichfield contends that Kubler's statement about abusing children, conning parents, and getting away with crimes is defamatory because it makes provably false assertions of fact.

fn2. Kubler sings: “One way or another, I'm gonna find ya, I'm gonna get ya, get ya, get ya, get ya // One way or another, I'm gonna win ya, I'm gonna get ya, get ya, get ya, get ya.” The Program, Part 3 at 48:55.

In total, the third episode is somewhat less personal than the first two episodes. Over the course of Part 3, Kubler interviews, inter alia: an anonymous staffer from Ivy Ridge, a sociologist, a plaintiff's lawyer, a pair of journalists, a lawyer who previously served in a state attorney general's office, two state legislators, and Lichfield's son. The episode reviews WWASP's purported political connections, and Kubler asks a Utah state legislator to prevent Lichfield's brother, Robert, from operating facilities for troubled teens. The episode, and thus the series, concludes with a clip of Kubler and her friends burning files from Ivy Ridge while the narrator calls her audience to action.

B

Lichfield filed the complaint in the District of Utah. He amended his pleading in short order. In the Amended Complaint, PAGE__1257 Lichfield pleaded five causes of action: defamation, defamation per se, false light invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and civil conspiracy. Defendants Kubler and Netflix (collectively, Kubler fn3) responded with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). She argued in support of dismissal that Lichfield's defamation claim rested upon statements that are non-actionable under Utah law and protected by the First Amendment. And, because Lichfield's remaining claims are derivative of defamation, she argued, they should be dismissed for the same reasons.

fn3. Kubler and Netflix are jointly represented, filed a joint brief, and have aligned interests in affirmance of the district court's opinion. To the extent that there is any daylight between their legal interests, it is not relevant here. For brevity, we refer to their joint arguments with only the lead Defendant's name.

In the same filing, Kubler submitted a special motion to strike under state statutory laws governing lawsuits that could chill free expression. These state laws – commonly styled Anti-Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (anti-SLAPP) statutes – may provide for, inter alia, attorneys’ fees if a court determines that a lawsuit was filed to chill First Amendment-protected speech. See Los Lobos Renewable Power, LLC v. Americulture, Inc., 885 F.3d 659, 662 (10th Cir. 2018). In her special motion, Kubler argued that Utah and California laws are interchangeable for the purposes of attorney fee awards and, in the alternative, that California's anti-SLAPP statute should apply because Defendants are based there.

Lichfield opposed both the Rule 12(b)(6) motion and the special motion under anti-SLAPP law. He argued that neither the First Amendment nor Utah law doomed his claims. He further argued that the district court should apply Utah's anti-SLAPP statute, not California's similar law. Also, he argued that a district court applying the Utah statute would conclude it “essentially mimics the language of Rule 12(b)(6)” and could proceed to apply the anti-SLAPP law by conducting a traditional Rule 12(b)(6) analysis. Aplt. App. at 241 (citation omitted). This analysis, Lichfield argued, would result in the conclusion that the Amended Complaint surmounted the Rule 12 standard and would allow his claims to proceed to discovery.

The district court saw it otherwise. It determined that all the contested statements were either opinions protected under state law and the First Amendment, did not imply any defamatory statements, or were true statements and thus not actionable. And because Lichfield could not state a claim for defamation, his remaining derivative claims also failed.

Regarding the special anti-SLAPP motion, the district court declined to decide whether Utah or California law should apply. Instead, it reasoned that under either statute, a motion to strike would be available when claims are subject to Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. And, because the Rule 12 standard was met, the district court concluded that Kubler was entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and costs.

Lichfield timely appeals.

II

On appeal, Lichfield presents three issues, though only one is truly central to resolution of the case. The primary question on appeal is the threshold legal question of whether Lichfield has properly alleged that any of Kubler's statements are subject to defamatory meaning. Under Utah defamation law, Utah constitutional PAGE__1258 law, and the First Amendment, the answer is no, so the claims must be dismissed.

Additionally, Lichfield argues that the district court erred in its application of state anti-SLAPP laws. But any error was invited in the district court. Lichfield further asks for leave to amend the operative complaint. fn4 He can show no legal basis for that relief. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291, we affirm.

fn4. Although Lichfield also argues on appeal that the district court “prematurely dismissed” the Amended Complaint by declining to decide whether he was a public figure for the purposes of the First Amendment, see Op. Br. at 43, there is no error in the district court's resolution of the case on narrower grounds than Lichfield would prefer. Because the merits of this question are not necessary to decide the appeal, we do not decide them.

A

We begin with the dismissal of the operative complaint. Because Lichfield appeals from an order issued under Rule 12(b)(6), the district court's determination is reviewed de novo. Hogan v. Winder, 762 F.3d 1096, 1104 (10th Cir. 2014). In this procedural posture, a court will typically defer to an operative complaint's well-pleaded factual allegations and affirm dismissal only where the plaintiff has failed to state “a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). However, in addition to the complaint's well-pleaded factual allegations, a court may “consider documents attached to or referenced in the complaint if they ‘are central to the plaintiff's claim and the parties do not dispute the documents’ authenticity.’ ” Brokers’ Choice of Am., Inc. v. NBC Universal, Inc., 861 F.3d 1081, 1103 (10th Cir. 2017) (quotation omitted). Here, because Lichfield's claims are entirely predicated on a three-part documentary miniseries, we will treat the Amended Complaint as incorporating the miniseries, which has itself been filed with both the district court and this court. To the extent that any of the Amended Complaint's allegations are in tension with the record video, the video will govern. See id. at 1101, 1105 (citing Jackson v. Alexander, 465 F.2d 1389, 1390 (10th Cir. 1972)). The parties agree that this is the correct approach.

There is another nuance relevant to our review of the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal in this case. Under Utah law, “whether a statement is capable of sustaining a defamatory meaning is a question of law.” Hogan, 762 F.3d at 1106 (alteration adopted) (quoting West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1008 (Utah 1994)). In cases alleging defamation, courts must determine at the threshold whether “a publication might be considered defamatory by a reasonable person” before the case may proceed to discovery and, ultimately, a jury trial. Id. (quoting Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 561 (Utah 1988)). Thus, as the parties rightly agree, Lichfield receives no deference when he states that the contested portions of the series are capable of defamatory meaning – those are legal conclusions, not factual allegations. Accord Brokers’ Choice, 861 F.3d at 1100 n.17 (deciding issue of truth on motion to dismiss).

B

Although Lichfield alleged five different causes of action in the district court, our review on appeal is relatively narrow, at least as a matter of doctrine. This is because the district court predicated its dismissal order on a holding that the statements at issue were incapable of defamatory meaning. And because this element of defamation could not be met, the district court held that Lichfield's derivative PAGE__1259 claims of defamation per se, IIED, and civil conspiracy also failed. Lichfield does not dispute this reasoning on appeal. Instead, he argues that we should reverse the dismissal of the derivative claims because the district court erred by holding the challenged statements were not defamatory as a matter of law. Thus, Lichfield's primary substantive challenge requires us only to determine whether the three contested segments of The Program: Part 3 are capable of defamatory meaning.

This case did not arise on a federal claim, and the district court exercised jurisdiction based on the parties’ diversity of state citizenship. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. A federal court exercising jurisdiction on the basis of diversity applies state substantive law, Racher v. Westlake Nursing Home Ltd. P'ship, 871 F.3d 1152, 1162 (10th Cir. 2017), and here the parties agree that Utah law applies to construe Lichfield's claims, see Op. Br. at 12; Resp. Br. at 26.

This court has recognized four elements of Utah defamation law, as enumerated by the Utah Supreme Court: “(1) that the defendants ‘published the statements’; (2) that the ‘statements were false, defamatory, and not subject to any privilege’; (3) ‘that the statements were published with the requisite degree of fault’; and (4) that ‘their publication resulted in damage’ to the plaintiff.” Hogan, 762 F.3d at 1105 (quoting West, 872 P.2d at 1007–08). Here, only the second element is at issue: whether the statements were false, defamatory, and not privileged by law.

Courts have enumerated several ways in which a statement might fail to meet this element. For example, if the statement is itself literally true and does not implicitly “convey a false representation of fact,” then it is not capable of defamatory meaning. Id. at 1106 (quoting Dixson v. Newsweek, Inc., 562 F.2d 626, 631 (10th Cir.1977)). Even if the challenged statement may not be literally true, where “a reasonable reader [or viewer] would not accept the statement[ ] at face value,” then it is not defamatory. Hogan, 762 F.3d at 1106. Additionally, if a statement does not “impeach[ ] an individual's honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation,” then it is not defamatory under Utah law. West, 872 P.2d at 1008. The First Amendment and Utah's constitutional law each also provide protection for certain opinion statements. West, 872 P.2d at 1015, 1017; Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody's Investor's Servs., Inc., 175 F.3d 848, 853 (10th Cir. 1999).

1

Applying these legal principles to the contested segments in the series is the challenge of this appeal. Consider first the photo of Lichfield tacked to a bulletin board, juxtaposed to a newspaper headline about a teen's death. To refresh: this scene appears at the opening of Part 3, in which the camera quickly moves from point to point on the bulletin board filled with images from Kubler's investigation. She narrates: “It bothers me how people low on the totem pole end up taking the fall. And the people at the top seem to get away with murder.” The Program, Part 3 at 00:27. As Kubler narrates, the camera rests on a newspaper clipping from the Salt Lake Tribune headlined “As Therapy Hikes Reviewed, Another Teen Dies in Program.” Id. Next to it is the image of Lichfield. See id.

Lichfield argues that the photo, newspaper clipping, and narration combine to create a defamatory message: that he was *1260 involved in the death of a child.fn5 This purportedly defamatory message was never directly stated in the series. Instead, “it is the implication arising from the statement and the context in which it was made,” that “forms the basis of [Lichfield's] claim.” West, 872 P.2d at 1011.

fn5. In the Amended Complaint, Lichfield characterized this segment of the series as defamatory because it implies he was “responsible for a murder,” Aplt. App. at 17, “either facilitat[ed] or [was] complicit in murder,” id. at 26, 28, 32, “involved in a murder,” id. at 34, and because it implicitly “accused [him] of murder, id. at 30. In his district court opposition to the motion to dismiss, Lichfield argued that he was falsely accused of “being complicit in or getting away with murder.” Id. at 225; accord id. at 230, 232, 242, 245. To the extent that Lichfield attempts to argue a broader theory on appeal – see, e.g., Op. Br. at 35 (construing the series as alleging that “his actions contributed to deadly outcomes in the troubled-teen industry”) – it is outside the scope of our review. United States v. Leffler, 942 F.3d 1192, 1196 (10th Cir. 2019).

A defamation-by-implication claim arising under Utah law is reviewed to determine whether the “the gist of the defendant's statement, rather than its literal meaning is ‘false, defamatory, and not subject to any privilege.’ ” Hogan, 762 F.3d at 1105 (quoting West, 872 P.2d at 1007). In examining the gist of the episode's challenged segment, courts “conduct a context-driven assessment of the alleged defamatory statement and reach an independent conclusion about the statement's susceptibility to a defamatory interpretation.” O'Connor v. Burningham, 165 P.3d 1214, 1222 (Utah 2007). If, in context, “a reasonable reader would not accept the statements at face value,” then “the statements do not cause damage to the plaintiff's reputation and are therefore not defamatory.” Hogan, 762 F.3d at 1106 (citing Mast v. Overson, 971 P.2d 928, 933 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)). “In this evaluation of context, we should examine: (1) the words themselves and their implications; (2) the entire article or message; (3) the events or disputes that gave rise to the article; and (4) the likely effect on the reasonable reader.” Id. (citing Dan B. Dobbs, Paul T. Hayden, and Ellen M. Bublick, The Law of Torts § 526 (2d ed. 2014)).

We start by considering the spoken words. Here, Lichfield complains of the narrative statement that “the people at the top seem to get away with murder,” in conjunction with a flash to the newspaper headline stating that “Another Teen Dies in Program.” The district court was correct that the phrase “get away with murder” is a “common idiom.” Aplt. App. at 281. Indeed, it is “usually used figuratively to describe someone who does something very bad or wrong without being criticized or punished.” Get Away with Murder, Merriam-Webster.com, https://perma.cc/R4EB-5ZUT. It is also true, though, that the term may be used in a literal sense to describe a person's evasion of culpability for homicide. See, e.g., Jed S. Rakoff, Getting Away With Murder, New York Review of Books, Dec. 2020 (describing allegations that corporate executives “have literally gotten away with murder” by virtue of deaths connected to faulty products); Brown v. Hearst Corp., 54 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 1995) (treating rhetorical question of whether a person could “get away with murder” as contributing to a TV program's suggestion that a man had killed his estranged wife). Here, to the extent that the term “get away with murder” could be taken literally, the headline's words “Teen Dies” might bolster that understanding. That the challenged phrase may – in the abstract – denote Lichfield's proffered meaning does provide some evidence in Lichfield's favor. But this is far from dispositive on its own. West, 872 P.2d at 1009 n.15.

PAGE__1261

Unfortunately for Lichfield, there is little else that supports his argument. In analyzing the “entire ... message,” Hogan, 762 F.3d at 1106, it is helpful to bear in mind that a “writing or program is normally viewed as a whole.” Brown, 54 F.3d at 27 (citing William Prosser & Page Keeton, Torts 781 (rev. ed. 1984)). Because the statements challenged in this case arise in the visual medium of documentary film, we find especially helpful the observation that “literary context” may be “critical in interpreting” the series for the existence of defamatory statements. Dobbs at § 526 (2d. ed. 2026). And in viewing all three episodes of the documentary, we agree with the district court that the series repeatedly uses a recurrent trope for an investigative program: a bulletin board filled with documents, maps, images, and news clippings to visually symbolize the effort toward and status of an ongoing investigation. See, e.g., The Accountant 2 (Artists Equity 2025); The Wire, Game Day (HBO 2002); see generally Only Murders in the Building (Hulu 2021). But the contents of the bulletin board do not necessarily tell a coherent visual story.

For instance, in Part 1, the camera pans behind Kubler's back while she looks at the bulletin board and narrates: “For the past decade, I've been investigating the program[.]” The Program, Part 1, at 2:11. At this point and from this angle, the bulletin board contains photos of a national politician juxtaposed with a publication titled “Parent Support News” and near a news clipping headlined “Czech school accused of torturing pupils.” See id. No reasonable viewer would perceive this juxtaposition to allege that the politician endorses “Parent Support News” as a publication or was involved in torture overseas. Instead, a reasonable viewer would understand that the bulletin board is filled with partially refined grist for the mill that is Kubler's investigation into the troubled-teen industry. It may be that placement on the board signifies some degree of relevance to her investigation, but the visual presentation does not go so far as to convey a conclusive link between items and images by virtue of their proximity to one another on a bulletin board.

When our view of the series becomes wider, Lichfield's claim is further imperiled. At the time the viewer encounters the challenged segment, Lichfield has not yet even been introduced by name. And from that point forward, there is no other mention – throughout the entirety of the three-hour series – of death, murder, or homicide as those terms could be taken to relate to Lichfield. The closest Kubler ever gets to this point is a non-specific reference to “crimes.” See infra. And the primary and motivating event that gave rise to the series, see Hogan, 762 F.3d at 1106, was not a death within a facility but instead Kubler's reckoning with her adolescent experience at Ivy Ridge.

The totality of the first challenged segment consists of a passing visual juxtaposition and the use of an idiomatic expression. Any reasonable viewer would understand that if Kubler had meant to accuse Lichfield of involvement in a teen's death, she would say more and say it explicitly at some point in the series. Thus, in this context, no reasonable viewer could accept the phrase “seems to get away with murder” at face value, cf. Hogan, 762 F.3d at 1106, but would instead understand it to be “exaggerated rhetoric intended to spark the debate,” CACI Premier Tech., Inc. v. Rhodes, 536 F.3d 280, 301 (4th Cir. 2008), about accountability for leaders in the troubled-teen industry. The first challenged segment is not defamatory as a matter of law.

2

We next turn to the second segment at issue, wherein Kubler discusses Lichfield's *1262 arrest in Costa Rica. About halfway through Part 3, the challenged segment is introduced by an interview with Lichfield's son. After the son describes Lichfield's decision to open a school in Costa Rica called Dundee, Kubler narrates: “Dundee was only open for nineteen months before authorities were alerted to abuse, raided the facility, and Narvin was arrested.” The Program, Part 3 at 30:36. The series displays a clip from an episode of Inside Edition contemporaneous to the arrest and Kubler further narrates: “Narvin didn't waste any time in rebuilding his Costa Rican facility into a new program called Pillars of Hope, only seven months after his previous program was raided.” Id. at 30:53.

Lichfield contends that the challenged segment is made defamatory not by what it says but by what it does not say. That is, his Amended Complaint alleges that he was defamed because the series mentions the arrest “without disclosing that he was exonerated, and all charges dismissed at the prosecutor's request.” Aplt. App. at 23. According to the Amended Complaint, this omission would lead a reasonable viewer to wrongly conclude that he was convicted of child abuse.

Where an allegation of defamation is predicated on omission rather than commission, the standard for liability is material falsity. Brokers’ Choice, 861 F.3d at 1108. That is, so long as the matter published is substantially true, the First Amendment will prohibit liability even if the publisher “failed to include additional facts which might have cast plaintiff in a more favorable or balanced light” or decided “to omit facts that may place the plaintiff under less harsh public scrutiny.” Id. (quotations omitted). And a court will look past “minor inaccuracies” to find a statement substantially true “so long as ‘the substance, the gist, the sting’ ” of the challenged statement “can be justified.” Masson v. New Yorker Mag., Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 516–17, 111 S.Ct. 2419, 115 L.Ed.2d 447 (1991) (quotation omitted). On the other side of the coin, a statement is materially false only if it “produces ‘a different effect on the mind of the [viewer] from that which the pleaded truth would have produced.’ ” Schwartz v. Am. Coll. of Emergency Physicians, 215 F.3d 1140, 1146 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Masson, 501 U.S. at 517, 111 S.Ct. 2419).

To support that he was defamed by omission, Lichfield attempts to distinguish and leverage the difference between an arrest and a criminal conviction. However, such a distinction must be considered against the substantial truth doctrine. After all, this court has credited reasoning that although there is “some difference between being a suspected participant in a heinous bombing and being a material witness in the investigation” of that bombing, a defamation action cannot proceed on such a distinction. Bustos v. A & E Television Networks, 646 F.3d 762, 768 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing Nichols v. Moore, 477 F.3d 396, 398, 401 (6th Cir. 2007)). So, to the extent that a “respectable community member” would find the difference between an arrest and a conviction “significant enough to make the misstatement actionable,” id., we doubt that same viewer would reason in the first instance that Lichfield's arrest was tantamount to his guilt and subsequent criminal conviction. That is, we do not see how the reasonable viewer could be ignorant of the difference between arrest and conviction but knowledgeable enough to credit a dismissal for lack of evidence. Even assuming away ad arguendo the inherent tension in Lichfield's theory, his argument has a bigger problem.

That problem is context. “Trying to focus on the defamatory words alone PAGE__1263 would be like trying to appreciate a pointillist painting by Seurat with a magnifying glass—the telling pattern would be lost in a maze of dots.” Hogan, 762 F.3d at 1106 (quoting Dobbs at § 526 (2d ed. 2014)). The relevant context here is that throughout the series Kubler calls for law enforcement and government officials to investigate and punish executives in the troubled-teen industry. See, e.g., The Program, Part 3 at 49:30. Indeed, the very thesis of Kubler's policy stance in the third episode is that executives like Lichfield have evaded liability for their mistreatment of children. And just after the challenged segment, Kubler narrates that Lichfield re-opened the Costa Rican facility seven months after the raid and his arrest. See The Program, Part 3 at 30:53. Thus, if the series had included the additional facts pleaded in the Amended Complaint – that charges “were voluntarily dropped by the public prosecutor,” which is “a nearly unprecedented outcome given the severity of the underlying allegations,” Aplt. App. at 24 – the gist of the challenged statement would remain the same. Or, in other words, the inclusion of this additional information would produce no “different effect,” Schwartz, 215 F.3d at 1146, than that already conveyed: executives in the troubled-teen industry tend to avoid legal liability for what the speaker argues to be misconduct.

Additionally, a series such as The Program will always be subject to an editing process that “obviously entails professional judgment. In this process material that is flattering or critical of a particular person may be included or eliminated.” Machleder v. Diaz, 801 F.2d 46, 54 (2d Cir. 1986). A person who is the subject of the speech is not entitled to hold the editor's pen or exercise a producer's review merely because he is the subject of a given segment or article. Just as a state legislature may not require newspapers to publish the responses of political candidates to unfavorable stories, Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258, 94 S.Ct. 2831, 41 L.Ed.2d 730 (1974), a private plaintiff is not entitled to the publication of every fact that might cast him “in a more favorable or balanced light,” Brokers’ Choice, 861 F.3d at 1108 (quotation omitted). So long as there is no statement of material falsehood – implied or otherwise – the director, editor, and producer must be free to exercise their collective editorial discretion.

Here, the “substance,” “gist,” and “sting” of the challenged statement “can be justified.” Masson, 501 U.S. at 516–17, 111 S.Ct. 2419. In other words, Lichfield has not shown this speech contained material falsehood. And without material falsity, there has been no defamation. Brokers’ Choice, 861 F.3d at 1108. The district court correctly found that the purported omission cannot render the truth of this segment defamatory. We agree that the second challenged segment is also not susceptible to defamatory meaning as a matter of law.

3

We turn now to the third challenged segment to determine whether it is susceptible to a defamatory meaning. The scene in question begins at a Utah karaoke bar, where Kubler drinks from a pint glass and Lichfield performs a song first recorded by Frank Sinatra. The Program, Part 3 at 47:39. While Lichfield dances, Kubler narrates:

It was surreal to see Narvin in person, knowing everything I know about this guy: the children he abused, the parents he conned, all the crimes he's gotten away with. Yet, here he is – free as a bird, singing Frank Sinatra at a club in Utah. I didn't talk to him because I didn't want to blow my cover. And I *1264 don't like giving abusers a platform to spew their bullshit.

Id. at 48:04. Once Lichfield has returned to his seat, Kubler takes a drink from a shot glass chased with lime before performing Blondie's “One Way or Another” with two friends. Id. at 48:30.

On appeal, Lichfield contends that Kubler's narrative statement is defamatory because it makes provably false assertions of facts. This is the closest call of the three challenged segments. But, ultimately, like the statements associated with the first two segments, Kubler's statements are not defamatory as a matter of law.

The inquiry again centers on whether the “statements were false, defamatory, and not subject to any privilege.” Hogan, 762 F.3d at 1105 (quoting West, 872 P.2d at 1007–08). When determining whether a statement is defamatory, the inquiry consists of “a context-driven assessment of the alleged defamatory statement.” O'Connor, 165 P.3d at 1222. And our contextual analysis relies on the four factors discussed above: “(1) the words themselves and their implications; (2) the entire article or message; (3) the events or disputes that gave rise to the article; and (4) the likely effect on the reasonable reader.” Hogan, 762 F.3d at 1106.

Also relevant is a question of privilege. Article I of the Utah Constitution protects expression of opinion even where that opinion might otherwise be defamatory. West, 872 P.2d at 1017. And the Utah Supreme Court has provided a non-exhaustive four factor test to discern whether a given statement is either factual – and thus potentially susceptible to defamatory meaning – or privileged opinion. See id. at 1018. The factors include:

1) “[T]he common usage or meaning of the words used;”

2) “whether the statement is capable of being objectively verified as true or false;”

3) “the full context of the statement – for example, the entire article or column – in which the defamatory statement is made; and”

4) “the broader setting in which the statement appears.”

Id. (citing Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc)).fn6

fn6. This non-exhaustive list of factors bears some resemblance to the factors relevant to determining whether a statement's context renders it non-defamatory despite its literal words. Cf. Hogan, 762 F.3d at 1106 (citing Dobbs at § 526 (2d ed. 2014)). The partial overlap makes sense: there, the inquiry is whether, in context, a statement is defamatory and “convey[s] a false representation of fact.” Id. (quotation omitted). Here, the inquiry is whether the statement is a privileged opinion rather than a factual assertion. We recognize, as a general matter, that opinions privileged by the Utah Constitution might also (though not always) independently fail to constitute defamation in the first instance because they convey no objectively verifiable fact.

The First Amendment does not provide “a wholesale defamation exemption for anything that might be labeled ‘opinion.’ ” Milkovich v. Lorain J. Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18, 110 S.Ct. 2695, 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990). But similar principles as those applicable under the Utah Constitution are operative, including a requirement that the plaintiff show proof of both fault and falsity, Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776, 106 S.Ct. 1558, 89 L.Ed.2d 783 (1986), thus exempting from liability statements made by media defendants on matters of public concern that constitute only “rhetorical hyperbole,” Greenbelt Co-op. Pub. Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14, 90 S.Ct. 1537, 26 L.Ed.2d 6 (1970). And statements that may not “ ‘reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts’ about an individual” are protected. PAGE__1265 Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20, 110 S.Ct. 2695 (alteration adopted) (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50, 108 S.Ct. 876, 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988)). These First Amendment principles can reasonably be said to protect at least “evaluative opinions.” Moody's Investor's Servs., 175 F.3d at 853. This means that statements that are “too indefinite to be proven true or false,” that are not subject to proof of falsity by objective evidence, or that are based on factual premises that have already been “fully disclosed” are exempt from liability under the First Amendment. Id. at 853–54 (collecting cases).

Kubler argues on appeal that her statements made at the karaoke bar are protected by the constitutions of both the United States and Utah. We agree. In this posture, we determine whether the First Amendment protects Kubler's statements by looking to whether they are mere evaluative opinions constituting “rhetorical hyperbole” or “imaginative expression[ ]” rather than “stating actual facts” about Lichfield. Mink v. Knox, 613 F.3d 995, 1005 (10th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). Because this analysis overlaps heavily with Utah's constitutional analysis, see West, 872 P.2d at 1018, we will discuss the doctrines in parallel.

Begin with the introductory clause: “It was surreal to see Narvin in person[.]” The Program, Part 3 at 48:04. Because it describes the experience of seeing Lichfield in person, we can infer that the clause is drawn from the speaker's personal experience. This conclusion is further reinforced by the word “surreal,” which itself is a subjective, qualitative descriptive term. Because there is nothing inherently surreal about seeing a person singing karaoke, we can easily infer that Kubler is describing her personal and subjective experience in this segment.

And, in the next portion of the sentence, the narrator makes explicit the reason for her experience of sur-reality: her personal knowledge. She continues: “knowing everything I know about this guy: the children he abused, the parents he conned, all the crimes he's gotten away with.” Id. at 48:07. Here, in referencing what she knows, Kubler ties the subjectivity of her experience to purportedly real-world occurrences. But the question remains whether these occurrences are “capable of being objectively verified as true or false.” West, 872 P.2d at 1018. Or, in the language of the First Amendment, whether they are “evaluative opinions,” that are “too indefinite to be proven true or false,” Moody's Investor's Servs., 175 F.3d at 853, or “rhetorical hyperbole” that falls short of “stating actual facts” about Lichfield. Mink, 613 F.3d at 1005.

Kubler makes three allegations that she presents as personal knowledge. The first is that there are children whom Lichfield “abused.” This could be understood in a certain context to mean specific types of abuse. For instance, if a prosecutor at a criminal hearing in a Utah courtroom represented to a judge that a particular person abused children, a reasonable listener would understand that to be an accusation of violating the state's prohibition on child abuse. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109. But there are other meanings that the relevant term “abused” can and does take in common speech. Elsewhere in the series, the term “abuse” is used to refer to Ivy Ridge staff members’ use of physical restraints that seem to at least border on assault. See, e.g., The Program, Part 1 at 33:20. This term is also used to refer to an adult's sexual exploitation of juveniles. See id. at 41:45; The Program, Part 2 at 59:20. But it is additionally used to refer to allegations of “isolation” and “brainwashing.” The Program, Part 2 at 14:44.

PAGE__1266

In the Amended Complaint, Lichfield concedes that the term may be used malleably. He alleges:

The [s]eries presented allegations of “abuse” that conflate loose definitions of abuse with actual claims of legal abuse, characterizing the military academy-style discipline of grossly troubled and criminally convicted teenagers (such as by turning ninety degrees at corners) as abuse while then accusing youth programs it claims Narvin was involved with of legitimate abuse, such as assault.

Aplt. App. at 18.

Dictionaries confirm that the term can take a broad range of meanings. People have been abused when they are “treat[ed] without consideration or fairness,” Abuse, Webster's Third New International Dictionary 8 (2002), “treat[ed] ... with cruelty or violence,” Abuse, New Oxford American Dictionary 7 (3d ed. 2010), or “hurt or injure[d] by maltreatment,” Abuse, American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 8 (5th ed. 2016). These broader definitions surely capture conduct that would fall outside the scope of criminal statutes. So, we will need to reference more than just the literal words that are challenged. Here, again, context is critical.

Turning back briefly to our hypothetical criminal proceeding, we would say that the “full context” of a prosecutor's statement would incorporate the “common usage” of the words in that setting to mean that the prosecutor referred to a violation of Utah's criminal law. See West, 872 P.2d at 1018. And such a statement would be “capable of being objectively verified,” presumably by a jury or other factfinder responsible for adjudicating guilt. See id. But when looking to the “full context” of Kubler's statement and the “broader setting in which [it] appears,” West, 872 P.2d at 1018, we reach a different conclusion.

To begin with, Kubler is not a prosecutor, and she did not speak in the context of a criminal hearing. She spoke, instead, in a narrative dubbed over top of video showing people drinking, dancing, and singing karaoke. Shortly after the challenged segment, Kubler, speaking to the camera from a front porch, underlines her lack of legal training. During this monologue she concedes that she does not know if a law enforcement agency will investigate Lichfield, whether he will be subject to prison time, or whether he will be subject to “whatever punishment is due for people who abuse children.” The Program, Part 3 at 49:45. After all, Kubler concedes, “I'm not a law enforcement agency, I'm just a kid trying to expose the truth. And it really just started out just to show my dad because he didn't believe me.” Id. at 50:05.

Indeed, Kubler is the quintessential unreliable narrator. She admits that she is “not a real journalist” and more of an “amateur gumshoe.” Id. at 3:11. Elsewhere in the series she compares herself to the wrongly-imprisoned protagonist in The Count of Monte Cristo and acknowledges that she returned to Ivy Ridge to get “revenge.” The Program, Part 1 at 27:47. And this story of revenge is expressly personal. In the series’ early segments, she describes “look[ing] back at” her home videos “and try[ing] to pinpoint where things went wrong.” Id. at 5:05. She describes her mother's death from cancer, id. at 5:32, and her father's re-marriage to her “evil stepmother,” id. at 6:08. Kubler recounts that when things “got really bad at home,” she began “beg[ging] her dad to go somewhere, anywhere, as long as [Kubler] didn't have to stay with” the stepmother. Id. at 6:46. The series explains that Kubler enrolled in a religious boarding school, and then, upon getting expelled, was taken to Ivy Ridge.

PAGE__1267

This is not only an origin story but a personal narrative framework around which the series is built. It is interspersed with clips from Kubler's childhood home videos, see, e.g., id. at 4:31; The Program, Part 3 at 51:58, and she repeatedly cries while discussing the effect of her experience at Ivy Ridge on her familial relationships, see, e.g., The Program, Part 2 at 21:40 (conversation with sisters); id. at 53:10 (conversation with father); The Program, Part 3 at 50:05 (monologue to camera). While interviewing a purported “cult expert,” Kubler says that she's “been going through a years-long process to try to deprogram” her father from what she believes to be a cult. The Program, Part 2 at 42:25. She cuts off in-person communication with him and reproduces images of his emails on screen. See, e.g., id. at 43:11. When they meet in person for the first time in years, she records it. Id. at 54:20. The meeting is not exactly mutually amicable. When he arrives, he is apparently unaware that he was going to be recorded. The first thing she asks him is: “What do you have to say for yourself?” Id. at 54:50.

In addition to centering her familial relationships in the narrative, Kubler also discusses the effects of her childhood experiences in the troubled-teen facility on her mental health. When burning files apparently taken from Ivy Ridge's abandoned campus, she tells her friends: “[T]his is therapy.” The Program, Part 3 at 59:40. She is also shown apparently engaging in literal talk therapy, id. at 57:34, and discusses her symptoms of complex post-traumatic stress disorder, id. at 56:58, and anxiety, which she attributes to her time at Ivy Ridge, The Program, Part 2 at 57:45.

Kubler does not just articulate these negative experiences and outcomes and attribute them to the troubled-teen industry, she also advocates for public policy changes and law enforcement intervention. When interviewing a Utah state senator, she asks him to watch the series to determine if Robert Lichfield – the Plaintiff-Appellant's brother – should be put on a “blacklist.” The Program, Part 3 at 46:40. In a different segment, she calls for law enforcement “get their shit together and investigate.” Id. at 49:45. And in the concluding minutes of the series, she broadens her demand for change: “There are thousands of children still trapped in these programs ... the abuse of a child is the business of anyone who knows about it. And now you know.” Id. at 1:03:35.

This is all to say that, contrary to the operative complaint, the series does not “present[ ] itself as an objective documentary” as a reasonable viewer would understand it. Contra Aplt. App. at 16. Kubler admits that she has an axe to grind and that her films are intended to be a piquant commentary on boarding schools for troubled teens. The series Kubler created is, at times, highly personal. It seeks to convince her father that her complaints are non-frivolous. And, simultaneously, it seeks to motivate law enforcement, legislators, and the public to modify their positions on the troubled-teen industry. Given this operative context and the broad range of meanings that the word “abused” can take, it is impossible to objectively verify whether or not Lichfield abused children in the meaning expressed by this segment.

In fact, a reasonable viewer would understand that Kubler refers to abuse in this context not to accuse Lichfield of some discrete act never aired, but to argue that he is responsible for conduct facilitated by WWASP that – in her view, and described elsewhere in the series – should be considered abuse, whether or not it is violative of a particular criminal statute. As Lichfield concedes on video, he's “either a sinner or a saint based on whatever argument you want to believe.” The Program, Part 3 at *1268 24:01. Kubler wants you to believe Lichfield is a sinner, not a saint. That is precisely the sort of subjective view that the Utah Constitution protects as privileged opinion. See West, 872 P.2d at 1018. And, similarly, under the First Amendment, she has stated “evaluative opinions,” Moody's Investor's Servs., 175 F.3d at 853, consisting of – at most – “rhetorical hyperbole,” Greenbelt, 398 U.S. at 14, 90 S.Ct. 1537.

Kubler's references to “the parents [Lichfield] conned,” and “all the crimes he's gotten away with” do nothing to change this conclusion. See The Program, Part 3 at 48:04. Like “abused,” the term “conned” takes a broad range of meanings. And it is used earlier in the episode to refer to WWASP's business model of “holding children hostage in remote locations with unqualified staff, while they con parents with cult-like seminars and collect the checks.” Id. at 22:20. So, again, the context shows that Kubler is not accusing Lichfield of some separate criminal fraud but instead critiquing a business model that she views and presents as illegitimate.

This court has previously credited the proposition that “lying” may be nonactionable hyperbole because it applies to a “spectrum of untruths.” See Brokers’ Choice, 861 F.3d at 1136 n.92 (citing Underwager v. Channel 9 Australia, 69 F.3d 361, 367 (9th Cir. 1995)). And we have also recognized that the First Amendment protected a news broadcast's opinion that a particular product was a “scam,” Moody's Investor's Servs., 175 F.3d at 854 (citing NBC Subsidiary (KCNC-TV), Inc. v. Living Will Ctr., 879 P.2d 6, 11–12 (Colo. 1994) (en banc)), because the statement expressed “nothing more than his judgment that people need not pay for a [certain product] because they can get [the most valuable portion] free,” Living Will Ctr., 879 P.2d at 11. The same principle applies here. Indeed, its application is even more powerful where it is presented not by a traditional broadcast journalist but by a self-admitted “amateur gumshoe” who thinks of herself as a “kid” and admits she is out for “revenge.”

For its part, “crime[ ]” can reasonably be said to refer to conduct prohibited by the broad scope of the criminal law. To the extent that Kubler could be alleging that Lichfield violated some already extant criminal statutes (and is not merely arguing for a shift in public policy to create new substantive crimes), her amorphous allegations are untethered from specific allegations of criminal activity that could be actionable under defamation laws. This sort of general reference to criminal activity is the sort of thing that is not “capable of being objectively verified as true or false,” West, 872 P.2d at 1018, because “there is simply no objective evidence that could prove that [it is] false,” Moody's Investor's Servs., 175 F.3d at 854.

The broad-sweeping and inherently subjective language of Kubler's statements, in conjunction with context that exacerbates their subjectivity, render her speech protected as privileged opinion under the Utah Constitution and as evaluative opinion under the First Amendment. The district court correctly held that Lichfield failed to allege a statement capable of defamatory meaning in this third contested segment.

C

We next turn to Lichfield's anti-SLAPP arguments made on appeal, which differ from the argument he made before the district court. On appeal, Lichfield argues that “state anti-SLAPP laws do not apply in federal diversity actions under Erie.” Op. Br. at 48 (bolding and capitalization omitted). Additionally, he argues that the district court independently erred by treating the anti-SLAPP standard as PAGE__1269 equivalent to Rule 12(b)(6) and “impos[ing] a consequence (fee-shifting) that would not normally attach” to dismissal under that Rule. Id. at 53. But Lichfield made neither of these arguments in the district court. In fact, his district court arguments were directly contrary to the arguments now made on appeal.

The invited error doctrine “prevents a party who induces an erroneous ruling from being able to have it set aside on appeal.” United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1203 (10th Cir. 1991). Or, stated otherwise, it “precludes a party from arguing that the district court erred in adopting a proposition that the party had urged the district court to adopt.” Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1208 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. DeBerry, 430 F.3d 1294, 1302 (10th Cir. 2005)). Because the doctrine only applies when the party has decided to argue a particular point, it is treated as a species of waiver, rather than forfeiture. Id. (citing United States v. Zubia-Torres, 550 F.3d 1202, 1206 (10th Cir. 2008)).

The doctrine applies here. In the district court, Kubler filed an omnibus motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and to strike pursuant to state anti-SLAPP laws. In the motion, she argued that Utah and California anti-SLAPP laws are identical for the purposes of this case, and – in the alternative – that the district court should apply California's law. Lichfield filed a brief in opposition. On the first page of his brief, he included a footnote stating: “Lichfield argues that the Utah [anti-SLAPP law] should be applied to all claims in this matter.” Aplt. App. at 225 n.1. Then, he headed the relevant subsection of his brief, in bold: “The Utah [Anti-SLAPP Law] Applies.” Id. at 239. In support of this argument he cited to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins for the proposition that “federal courts sitting in diversity apply the forum state's substantive law.” Id. at 240 (citing 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938)). He went on to argue that application of the Utah law “does not automatically dismiss [his] claims. The court must still conduct a claim-by-claim analysis under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard.” Id.

So, when Lichfield now argues on appeal that “under binding Tenth Circuit precedent, the district court should have denied the anti-SLAPP motion outright on Erie grounds,” Op. Br. at 52, his audience is unreceptive. Lichfield made precisely the opposite argument in district court: that Erie should lead to application of Utah anti-SLAPP law and that his claims survived the motion. Lichfield could have argued to the district court that state anti-SLAPP laws are categorically inapplicable in federal court, and – in the alternative – that Utah law would be the appropriate choice of law if application of such laws did comport with Erie. Cf. Peterson, 707 F.3d at 1208. But Lichfield made no such argument. Thus, on appeal, he “cannot be heard to complain of any [such] alleged error.” Id.

The same principle applies to Lichfield's argument that the district court erred by treating the anti-SLAPP standard as equivalent to Rule 12(b)(6). He asked the district court to follow that procedure. Now, unhappy with the result, he complains that the district court accepted his argument. He has invited these errors, and so he must live with them. We treat Lichfield's anti-SLAPP arguments as waived.

D

Lichfield additionally argues that the district court erred by dismissing his suit without granting him leave to amend the complaint. But he also implicitly concedes that he did not move for leave to amend in the manner contemplated by our *1270 caselaw. See Reply Br. at 24–25. And he is right to concede, because his opposition to dismissal in the district court contained only one line requesting leave to amend, and only if Kubler's motion was granted. This court has said that a “single sentence, lacking a statement for the grounds for amendment and dangling at the end of [a] memorandum [does] not rise to the level of a motion for leave to amend.” Calderon v. Kansas Dep't of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 181 F.3d 1180, 1187 (10th Cir. 1999). We think it makes no difference for purposes of this rule that Lichfield's single sentence appeared on the first, rather than last, page of his opposition briefing. Because he did not move for leave to amend in the manner required, the district court “did not abuse its discretion in failing to address [his] request.” Id.

E

Finally, we address an issue that only became operative on appeal. In his Opening Brief, Lichfield included citation to a legal authority that does not exist, see Op. Br. at 39, and characterized two cases in manners wholly unsupported by the text of the opinions, see Op. Br. at 43, 45. Kubler pointed out these errors in response, see Resp. Br. at 48–49, and although Lichfield conceded in reply that his Opening Brief “contained several citation errors” and contended that the errors “h[ad] been corrected,” he did not file a corrected brief, see Reply Br. at 6. When questioned at oral argument, counsel offered to file a notice directly correcting the statements at issue. And, indeed, the authoring attorney filed the next day a Notice of Errata, identifying the specific errors in the opening brief and providing actual, existing authority that could support the arguments made.

The rules of this court provide that when an attorney presents a brief to the court, they certify, inter alia, that they have undertaken a reasonable inquiry to ensure that “the issues presented are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law.” 10th Cir. R. 46.5(B)(2). It should go without saying that a bare-minimum reasonable inquiry will ensure legal authorities cited in papers submitted to the court actually exist, and the quotations or propositions attributed to them also exist. The Opening Brief in this case therefore failed to fully comply with Rule 46.5.

The filing of this non-compliant brief is conduct sanctionable at our discretion. 10th Cir. R. 46.5(C). Our rules empower us to issue sua sponte sanctions, which may include: dismissal of the appeal, an order of monetary payments, initiation of disciplinary proceedings, and an order to pay the opposing party's reasonable expenses that resulted from the paper in question. Id.

This court has recently issued sanctions for the use of generative artificial intelligence that resulted in the filing of a brief with citations to seven cases that do not exist and two cases that do exist but do not contain the quotations that the briefing alleged. Amarsingh v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., No. 24-1391, 2026 WL 352016, at *5 (10th Cir. Feb. 9, 2026) (unpublished).fn7 There, the filer – who is a barred attorney but was litigating the case pro se – addressed the issue with “candor,” and we stated that we “appreciate that she is willing to try to do better” and “may have taken steps in that direction.” Id. at *6. PAGE__1271 But this was ultimately not sufficient to wholly mitigate her frivolous argument. Id. at *7. We thus ordered the attorney to pay $1,000 to offset opposing counsel's fees and costs and directed the Clerk's Office to refer the matter to the relevant disciplinary body. Id. at *7–8.

fn7. We cite unpublished decisions for their persuasive value only and do not treat them as binding precedent. 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).

Here, the errors are not as egregious. Although we assume the use of generative artificial intelligence led to the misrepresentations of legal authority, the brief here had significantly fewer errors than in Amarsingh. But, on the other hand, generative artificial intelligence is no longer a novel tool. Attorneys who choose to use it must be willing to also apply “actual intelligence in its execution.” Id. at *6 (quotation omitted). We are further concerned that the Reply Brief did not appropriately remedy the misstatements of law. After briefly acknowledging “several citation errors” and contending that they “have been corrected,” counsel went on to attack the opposing party. Reply Br. at 6. He contended that “[t]he more significant issue” was “mischaracterizations of controlling authority” in the Response Brief. Id. But those purported mischaracterizations were grounded in the words of cases that indeed exist. It is the court that decides which issues are “more significant.” And the errors in the Opening Brief are more significant in this case.

We appreciate that counsel filed a Notice of Errata the day after oral argument. But it should not have taken questioning at argument to elicit such a response. Submission of a brief containing fabricated or hallucinated citations is a divergence from the standards expected of attorneys appearing before this court. Any such error should be corrected explicitly and without prompting.

The missteps in this case do not merit sanctions. However, counsel should take note that although generative artificial intelligence may attract with the promise of less laborious brief writing, its use may result in hallucinated falsities. Counsel is responsible for ensuring briefs and representations made to the court are warranted by the law and supported by the record, no matter the technology used to create them.

AFFIRMED.

Lichfield v. Kubler, 2025 WL 2772468 (D.Utah, Sep. 29, 2025).

United States District Court, D. Utah.

NARVIN LICHFIELD, Plaintiff,

v.

KATHERINE KUBLER and NETFLIX, INC., Defendants.

Case No. 2:24-cv-00458-JNP-CMR

Filed 09/29/2025

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS AND FOR RELIEF UNDER ANTI-SLAPP ACTS

Jill N. Parrish United States District Court Judge

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Narvin Lichfield sued Katherine Kubler and Netflix, Inc. (collectively, the defendants), alleging that a documentary series created by Kubler and streamed on Netflix defamed him. Lichfield asserts claims for defamation per se, defamation, false light, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy. Before the court is the defendants’ motion to dismiss this action and for relief under the Anti-SLAPP Act of either California or Utah. ECF No. 28. The motion is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND fn1

fn1. “Generally, a court considers only the contents of the complaint when ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion.” Berneike v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 708 F.3d 1141, 1146 (10th Cir. 2013). But a court may consider a document submitted by a defendant if (1) “the document is referred to in the complaint,” (2) it “is central to the plaintiff’s claim,” and (3) the defendant submits “an indisputably authentic copy to the court.” Id. In this case, the basis for all of the Lichfield’s claims is the Netflix documentary series entitled The Program: Cons, Cults, and Kidnapping, which is explicitly referred to in the operative complaint. The defendants have submitted an undisputably authentic copy of the series to the court. Accordingly, the court considers the content of this series in reciting the facts of the case and in resolving the motion to dismiss.

During her sophomore year of high school, Kubler’s parents enrolled her in a private Christian boarding school in Long Island, New York. A few months after she arrived, the school expelled her under its zero-tolerance policy because she had been caught with an alcoholic beverage. Due to her expulsion, Kubler’s parents decided to place her in a lockdown behavior modification program located in Upstate New York called The Academy at Ivy Ridge, which was marketed to parents as a boarding school for troubled teens. Kubler spent the next 15 months at Ivy Ridge without being allowed to go home.

Kubler later went to film school and began a career in the entertainment industry. She decided to create a documentary series about Ivy Ridge. Kubler produced and directed a three-part series called The Program: Cons, Cults, and Kidnapping, which streamed on Netflix.

The first episode of The Program describes the experiences of Kubler and other teenagers at Ivy Ridge. Kubler recounted being strip searched upon arrival and then introduced to the facility’s strict regime of rules, including: no talking at all unless directed to do so, no going outside, no looking outside the windows, no eye contact with other students, no touching other students, no looking in the mirror, and no smiling. One of the most important rules was that detainees could not ask their parents to bring them home, which was labeled as manipulation.

These rules were enforced 24 hours a day. Teenagers detained at Ivy Ridge could earn some privileges by advancing through its level system, which was called “working the program.” Detainees gained points by complying with all of the rules, and if enough points were earned, teens could advance to the next level. Conversely, even minor infractions would result in the loss of points or levels. A detainee who reached level three could have a 15-minute monitored phone call with his or her parents once a month. At level four, the detainee could talk and look out of windows. But these upper-level detainees were required to become enforcers by reporting infractions committed by other detainees. Detainees were not allowed to leave Ivy Ridge until they reached level six. Kubler opined that the leaders of Ivy Ridge intentionally made it nearly impossible to advance to level six in order to keep the detainees in the program for as long as possible.

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If the point system failed to induce compliance, Kubler alleged that more drastic measures were taken. Detainees would be violently taken to the floor and then transported to a small isolation room where they were required to hold stress positions or lay face down on the floor for hours. Some detainees in the isolation rooms were physically assaulted or given only two pieces of bread and eight ounces of milk for their meals.

The primary theme of the second episode of The Program is Kubler’s contention that Ivy Ridge employed time-tested mind control techniques on teenagers detained in the facility. Kubler asserted, for example, that every six weeks detainees were required to participate in a seminar that lasted between two and four days. Some of the seminar activities included requiring participants to crawl on the floor like a baby for an hour and forcing them to scream and beat the floor as hard as they could with towels wrapped in duct tape until complete exhaustion. Detainees who stopped participating before time was called were sent to an alternative seminar called “breakpoint” because the intent of the seminar was to break the detainee. Breakpoint participants were required to perform tasks such as chanting a meaningless mantra in unison for eight hours straight until they entered a dissociative trance. Kubler asserted that these activities—in conjunction with inadequate food, sleep deprivation, and the weaponization of embarrassing personal history details or coerced confessions—were intended to break down all resistance and to convince them that their only option was to surrender themselves to “the program.”

Parents were also put through a separate series of seminars held about once a month. In these seminars, parents participated in guided meditation and engaged in group activities designed to get them outside of their comfort zone. Kubler contended that the central message of the parent seminars was not to give in to their children’s requests to come home and not to remove their children from the facility before they completed the program.

In the third episode of The Program, entitled “Follow the Money,” Kubler examines the larger troubled-teen industry. In particular, she focuses on the history and structure of the World Wide Association of Specialty Programs (WWASP), which was founded by Robert Lichfield. In 1988, Robert Lichfield founded his first facility for troubled teens in La Verkin, Utah. He later created WWASP, which acted as an umbrella organization for numerous other troubled teen facilities that were established across the United States and around the world, including Ivy Ridge. WWASP provided the template for running a troubled teen program to each member facility. It also provided services, such as supervising media relations, and putting on seminars. In exchange, the member facilities paid WWASP a fee for each teen detained in the facility. Kubler asserted that Robert Lichfield accumulated a great deal of personal wealth through WWASP by charging parents exorbitant fees while spending as little as possible on staffing and other expenses.

The third episode also examined other figures associated with WWASP, including Robert’s brother, plaintiff Narvin Lichfield. Kubler asserted that Narvin Lichfield created the original marketing materials for WWASP and pioneered the use of search engine optimization to ensure that parents searching for help with their teenagers on the internet would be directed to a WWASP website. Narvin Lichfield later opened and operated three troubled teen facilities under the WWASP umbrella: one in South Carolina and two in Costa Rica.

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After The Program began streaming on Netflix, Narvin Lichfield sued Kubler and Netflix, asserting claims for defamation per se, defamation, false light, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy. Lichfield alleged that the following statements found in the third episode of the documentary series were actionable:

(1) In the opening scene of the third episode, the camera focuses on several sections of a bulletin board with photographs of individuals, news articles, and biographical information about the pictured individuals attached to it. The first and second shots depicted low-level workers at Ivy Ridge and its director. The third shot showed pictures of individuals with ownership stakes in troubled teen facilities along with well-known politicians. The fourth shot depicted a picture of Narvin Lichfield next to a news article with the headline: “As Therapy Hikes Reviewed, Another Teen Dies in Program.” While the camera progresses through these shots, Kubler provides the following voiceover: “It bothers me how people low on the totem pole end up taking the fall, and the people at the top seem to get away with murder. I knew if I really wanted to go after these places, I need to follow the money.”

(2) In one scene of the third episode, Kubler went to a karaoke night at a public nightclub after seeing Narvin Lichfield’s social media post inviting people to come. Kubler filmed both Lichfield and herself singing at the nightclub. During this scene, Kubler narrated the following voiceover:

It was surreal to see Narvin in person—knowing everything I know about this guy, the children he abused, the parents he conned, all of the crimes he’s gotten away with.... You know, all these people, they’ve gotten away with this stuff for so long. So, I think a lot of them really do think they got away with it. I think Narvin, I think Robert, they’ve gotten away with it for so long.

(3) Referring to the first Costa Rican troubled teen facility opened by Narvin Lichfield, called Dundee, Kubler stated: “Dundee was only open for 19 months before authorities were alerted to abuse, raided the facility, and Narvin was arrested.”

Lichfield also alleged that the juxtaposition of his picture and the news article about the death of a teen during the opening scene of episode three implied that he was somehow involved with the death. And although Lichfield did not identify any specific statements made in the documentary series, the complaint also asserted that the series defamed him by “[c]laiming Plaintiff had exercised direct control in youth programs with the aim or understood purpose of abusing children” and by “[p]resenting statements that Plaintiff was effectively a mastermind and architect, along with his brother Robert, of an abusive system of youth programs.” ECF No. 5 at ¶ 77.

Defendants Kubler and Netflix filed the instant motion seeking two forms of relief. First, they seek dismissal of Lichfield’s action under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim for relief. Second, the defendants move to either strike Lichfield’s claims pursuant to California’s Anti-SLAPP statute or to dismiss the claims under Utah’s Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA). The defendants also request an award of fees and costs under these two statutes.

ANALYSIS

I. MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 12(b)(6)

A. Legal Standard

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Rule 12(b)(6) provides that a court may dismiss a complaint if it fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). When considering a motion to dismiss, a court “accept[s] as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint.” Burnett v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 706 F.3d 1231, 1235 (10th Cir. 2013). Although courts normally view these allegations “in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,” id., there are two caveats to this rule when determining whether a defamation claim brought under Utah law is subject to dismissal. To uphold constitutional protections of speech, courts do not draw inferences in favor of the plaintiff when determining (1) whether an allegedly defamatory statement is capable of a defamatory meaning or (2) whether the statement is one of fact or opinion. Mathews v. McCown, 2025 UT 34, ¶¶ 6, 98, --- P.3d ---.

B. Defamation and Defamation Per Se

Lichfield asserts claims for defamation and defamation per se against the defendants based on statements and alleged inferences found in The Program. To state a claim for defamation, he must show that the defendants “published the statements concerning him, that the statements were false, defamatory, and not subject to any privilege, that the statements were published with the requisite degree of fault, and that their publication resulted in damage.” West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1007–08 (Utah 1994). To state a claim for defamation per se, Lichfield must also show that the defamatory statements were “on their face, and without the aid of intrinsic proof, ... unmistakably recognized as injurious.” Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d 968, 977 n.7 (Utah 1981). If the statements are deemed defamatory per se, the plaintiff need not prove damages. Id.

The defendants argue that the court should dismiss the defamation and defamation per se claims. Because the defendants’ arguments center on elements that are common to both of these causes of action, the court analyzes them jointly.

1) Statements about seeming “to get away with murder” and getting away with abuse, conning parents, and unspecified crimes

In The Program, Kubler makes the following allegedly defamatory statements: (1) “It bothers me how people low on the totem pole end up taking the fall, and the people at the top seem to get away with murder” and (2) “the children he [Lichfield] abused, the parents he conned, all of the crimes he’s gotten away with.” The defendants argue that these statements are not actionable because they are constitutionally protected opinions rather than assertions of fact. The court agrees.

The free speech protections found in the Federal and Utah Constitutions limit liability for defamation. Jensen v. Sawyers, 130 P.3d 325, 336 (Utah 2005) (“Defamation claims always reside in the shadow of the First Amendment.”); West, 872 P.2d at 1015 (holding that the Utah Constitution limits liability for defamation). Specifically, the Utah Constitution protects expressions of opinion from liability for defamation. “Because expressions of pure opinion fuel the marketplace of ideas and because such expressions are incapable of being verified, they cannot serve as the basis for defamation liability.” West, 872 P.2d at 1015. In contrast, “[a]ssertions of fact, being objectively verifiable and much more capable of harming reputation, are not entitled to the same degree of protection afforded expressions of opinion.” Id. Thus, in order to prove a defamation claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendant stated or implied facts that are both false and defamatory. Id. Courts consider four non-exhaustive factors to distinguish facts from opinions:

PAGE_5

Id. at 1018. “Whether a statement is one of fact or opinion is a question of law for the court to decide.” Mathews, 2025 UT 34, ¶ 96.

Applying the West factors, the court determines that the “seem to get away with murder” statement is an expression of opinion rather than fact. This statement employes the common idiom “to get away with murder” to figuratively describe Kubler’s view that the individuals who had profited from troubled teen programs had avoided any negative consequences for owning or operating them. Kubler’s use of the introductory phrase “seem to” emphasizes that the statement is used metaphorically, and not to literally accuse leaders and owners of these programs of being culpable of the crime of murder. The broader context of the documentary series as a whole reinforces this understanding of the phrase. Throughout the series, Kubler accuses these leaders of profiting from an abusive system. But she does not accuse them of murder. Finally, this statement, taken in context, is an expression of moral disapprobation that is not capable of being proved true or false. Accordingly, Kubler’s statement that leaders like Lichfield “seem to get away with murder” is a constitutionally protected opinion.

The phrase “the children he abused, the parents he conned” also expresses an opinion. Throughout the three-episode series, Kubler consistently expressed her view that the tactics employed in WWASP-associated facilities were abusive and psychologically damaging. She also opined that WWASP programs used manipulative techniques to encourage parents to keep their children in facilities for as long as possible. And given her assessment that these programs were abusive and ineffective, she expressed her belief that the monthly fees were a waste of money. In the context of these expressed viewpoints, statements about the children Lichfield abused and the parents he conned are protected opinions. There is no way to objectively verify whether the WWASP methodology should be considered abusive or merely tough love for troubled teens. See Rinsley v. Brandt, 700 F.2d 1304, 1306–07, (10th Cir. 1983) (holding that strong criticisms of a psychiatrist, including “God knows what other cruelties he calls treatment” and “What does it take to put a stop to such a man? How many more children must die?” were protected opinions). Nor is it possible to definitively ascertain whether parents were conned out of their money or whether it was well spent. See Rizzuto v. Nexxus Prods. Co., 641 F. Supp. 473, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that the phrase “don’t be conned” was “no more than rhetorical hyperbole”).

Similarly, Kubler’s reference to “all of the crimes [Lichfield has] gotten away with” expresses a protected opinion. Accusing an individual of committing a specific criminal act is typically an assertion of fact. See Mathews, 2025 UT 34, ¶¶ 99–101 (holding that an accusation that a plaintiff “defrauded the entire community” was not a protected opinion because, in context, the best understanding of the statement “is that [the defendant] was accusing [the plaintiffs] of committing crimes and not offering opinions about their character or conduct”); Hogan v. Winder, 762 F.3d 1096, 1107 (10th Cir. 2014) (applying Utah law and holding that “[f]alse accusations of criminal conduct can be defamatory, of course”). But a speaker’s use of words that may carry criminal connotations do not always constitute assertions of fact. In Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Association, Inc. v. Bresler, for example, the Supreme Court held that the use of the term “blackmail” during a heated city council meeting did not amount to a criminal accusation. 398 U.S. 6, 13–14 (1970). The Court analyzed the elements of the crime of blackmail and reasoned that the defendants never indicated that the plaintiff had engaged in conduct approximating criminal blackmail. Id. at 14 n.7. Instead, “the word was no more than rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet used by those who considered [the plaintiff’s] negotiating position extremely unreasonable.” Id. at 14.

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In The Program, Kubler does not accuse Lichfield of specific criminal conduct. Indeed, her generic statement about unspecified crimes Lichfield had gotten away with provides no temporal or other limitation that would hint at a particular crime. See Nunes v. Rushton, 299 F. Supp. 3d 1216, 1232 (D. Utah 2018) (finding that a statement that the plaintiff should investigate whether she was “guilty of harassment” was a protected opinion because the defendant did “not allege or imply that [the plaintiff] committed any specific criminal acts”). Absent any indication as to what crimes Lichfield may have committed, it is difficult to conceive of what specific assertion of fact could be examined in a trial or how the statement could be proven true or false. In light of the generality of Kubler’s statement, it is best understood as rhetorical hyperbole emphasizing Kubler’s opinions regarding the tactics employed at WWASP faculties. See Westmont Residential LLC v. Buttars, 340 P.3d 183, 189 (Utah Ct. App. 2014) (holding that the defendant’s use of the term “crooks” was “no more than rhetorical hyperbole” (citation omitted)). In other words, Kubler’s statement amounts to an expression of a strong negative opinion akin to accusing Lichfield of “crimes against humanity” and not an assertion of provable fact.

The context in which the statement was made further emphasizes that it is no more than rhetorical hyperbole. In The Program, Kubler tells a personal story about her traumatic experiences as a teenager at Ivy Ridge and how that event strained her relationship with her father for many years thereafter. In the scene of the documentary where Kubler makes the “crimes” statement, she describes her reaction to seeing Lichfield in person in light of those personal experiences and her investigation of the troubled-teen industry, stating: “It was surreal to see Narvin in person—knowing everything I know about this guy ....” Because Kubler’s reference to “crimes” Lichfield “had gotten away with” was couched as a description of her visceral response in light of her personal experiences, a viewer would take the statement as a hyperbolic expression of strong opinion rather than an accusation of specific criminal conduct. See Ferlauto v. Hamsher, 74 Cal. App. 4th 1394, 1402–03 (1999) (holding that in the context of a book describing the author’s personal experiences and feeling regarding a lawsuit against her, a reasonable reader would take the author’s statements as “highly partisan opinions” rather than assertions of fact); West, 872 P.2d at 1020 (holding that the fact that the allegedly defamatory statements appeared in editorial columns “as opposed to ‘hard news’ ” indicated that they constituted protected opinions). Indeed, Kubler indicated that she was expressing her opinion by stating that she was articulating her personal thoughts about Lichfield getting away with it: “So, I think a lot of them really do think they got away with it.”

In short, none of the statements regarding getting away with murder or getting away with unspecified crimes are actionable because they are protected opinions.

2) Alleged defamatory implication from the image of the news article

Lichfield also alleges that the image showing his picture adjacent to a news article with the headline “As Therapy Hikes Reviewed, Another Teen Dies in Program” is defamatory. He argues that this juxtaposition would cause reasonable viewers to believe he was involved with or somehow responsible for the death referenced in the headline. Thus, Lichfield asserts a defamation-by-implication claim rather than by a direct statement. See West, 872 P.2d at 1011 (holding that under a defamation-by-implication claim, “it is the implication arising from the statement and the context in which it was made, not the statement itself, which forms the basis of [the] claim”). When a plaintiff asserts a claim for defamation by implication, the court must first determine whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the underlying statement (or in this case, the underlying image) “conveys the allegedly defamatory implication.” Id at 1019. In making this determination, courts must examine the context in which the underlying statement was made. Id. at 1011 n.18; Hogan, 762 F.3d at 1105–06 (10th Cir. 2014) (applying Utah law).

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Here, the context in which Lichfield’s picture and the article were presented would not lead a reasonable viewer to believe that the documentary series implied that Lichfield was responsible for the death referenced in the headline. First, the scene in which the image appears does not lend itself to the alleged defamatory implication. During the introduction to episode three, Kubler employed the well-worn trope of an investigator pinning evidence to a bulletin board in an attempt to solve a case—or here, to “follow the money.” She depicted a board covered with pictures of individuals who worked at Ivy Ridge, individuals who financed or owned troubled teen facilities, politicians, and leaders of WWASP and WWASP facilities. Interspaced between the pictures were various news articles about the troubled teen industry, LinkedIn profiles, and a variety of other documents. These disparate pictures and documents are crowded together on the board so that they overlap. At the center of the board is a map of the United States with red string attached to pins linking locations on the map with various documents on the board. For approximately fifteen seconds, the camera zooms in on various sections of the board. And for about two seconds, the camera focuses on a picture of Lichfield next to the article. Because the board represents a jumble of pictures and other documents mixed together that reference the troubled-teen industry as a whole, a reasonable viewer would not assign significance to the juxtaposition of Lichfield’s picture and the article. Indeed, at this point in the documentary series, the viewer is unaware of who Narvin Lichfield is because the series does not even mention him until later in episode three.

Viewing this two-second shot in context of episode three as a whole also demonstrates that viewers would not draw the alleged defamatory inference. Later on in the episode, Kubler describes in detail Lichfield’s role in the troubled-teen industry, including working on the marketing for WWASP and later opening and operating three WWASP facilities. Because episode three specified Lichfield’s role in the industry, which had nothing to do with “therapy hikes” or other wilderness therapy programs, viewers would not infer that Lichfield had anything to do with a death during a therapy hike. Although episode three briefly addresses wilderness programs for troubled teens, it does not tie these programs in any way to Lichfield.

For these reasons, no reasonable factfinder could conclude that the image of Lichfield’s picture next to an article about therapy hikes conveys a defamatory implication. Accordingly, the court dismisses the defamation and defamation per se claims to the extent that they are based on allegations of this defamatory inference. See Keisel v. Westbrook, 542 P.3d 536, 552–53 (Utah Ct. App 2023) (affirming summary judgment in favor of a defendant on a defamation-by-implication claim because a reasonable fact finder could not have drawn the alleged defamatory inference).

3) Statement that Lichfield had been arrested in Costa Rica

Lichfield claims that Kubler defamed him when she stated that Costa Rican authorities raided one of his facilities and arrested him. He acknowledges that this statement is true. But Lichfield argues that Kubler may nonetheless be held liable for stating the truth because she did not also say that Costa Rican authorities later dropped the charges against him. He contends that Kubler defamed him by “omitting information that would exonerate him or present a more balanced picture of his involvement in youth programs.” ECF No. 35 at 13.

This claim fails as a matter of law because “truth is an absolute defense to an action for defamation.” Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 57 (Utah 1991). “The omission of additional favorable information from an otherwise true publication does not render a statement materially false.” Brokers’ Choice of Am., Inc. v. NBC Universal, Inc., 861 F.3d 1081, 1108 (10th Cir. 2017). Lichfield asserts that the Restatement (Second) of Torts supports his incomplete truth argument. The provision he cites provides that a statement of opinion may be actionable “only if it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566 (1977); accord Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18 (1990) (“[E]xpressions of ‘opinion’ may often imply an assertion of objective fact.”). On its face, this provision does not apply to true statements of fact. Accordingly, the court dismisses Lichfield’s defamation and defamation per se claims to the extent that they rely on the arrest statement.

4) Allegations that the series stated that he was a “mastermind”

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In his complaint, Lichfield alleges that the defendants defamed him by “[c]laiming Plaintiff had exercised direct control in youth programs” and by “[p]resenting statements that Plaintiff was effectively a mastermind and architect, along with his brother Robert, of an abusive system of youth programs.” ECF No. 5 at ¶ 77. In his briefing on this motion to dismiss, Lichfield does not specify the foundation for these claims, merely asserting that “the Series goes to great lengths to portray Lichfield as a central figure in the WWASP organization.”

These allegations are not specific enough to support a defamation claim. When pleading a defamation claim, the plaintiff “must describe the nature or substance of the acts or words complained of.” Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982). Specifically, the complaint “must set forth ‘the language complained of ... in words or words to that effect.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). Lichfield did not identify which declarations allegedly stated or implied that Lichfield was a “mastermind or architect” of WWASP. Nor is it evident from reviewing the documentary series what statements are being referenced in the complaint. Due to this complete lack of specificity, the court dismisses the defamation and defamation per se claims to the extent that Lichfield alleges he was defamed by statements that he was a mastermind of an abusive system.

5) Conclusion

The statements that Lichfield claims to be defamatory are either constitutionally protected opinions or absolutely privileged as true. Moreover, a reasonable viewer would not draw the alleged defamatory implication alleged in the complaint. Accordingly, the court dismisses the defamation and defamation per se claims.

C. False Light

Lichfield asserts a false light claim based on the same statements and alleged inferences discussed above for the defamation and defamation per se claims. False light claims are very similar to defamation claims. SIRQ, Inc. v. The Layton Companies, Inc., 379 P.3d 1237, 1246 (Utah 2016). Accordingly, “false light claims that arise from defamatory speech raise the same First Amendment concerns as are implicated by defamation claims.” Id. The same principles that limit liability under defamation law also apply to false light claims. Jensen v. Sawyers, 130 P.3d 325, 336 (Utah 2005); Keisel v. Westbrook, 542 P.3d 536, 556–57 (Utah Ct, App. 2023). Accordingly, the court dismisses the false light claim for the same reasons that it dismisses the defamation claims.

D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Lichfield also asserts a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) based on the allegedly defamatory statements and inferences. Similar to a false light claim, constitutional protections of free speech also restrict liability for IIED claims. Keisel v. Westbrook, 542 P.3d 536, 556–57 (Utah Ct. App. 2023). In other words, “[a] plaintiff may not attempt an end-run around First Amendment strictures protecting speech by instead suing for defamation-type damages under non-reputational tort claims.” Id. at 556 (citation omitted). Thus, the court dismisses the IIED claim for the same reasons that the false light claim must be dismissed.

The IIED claim must also be dismissed because the statements that allegedly cause emotional distress are not egregious enough to support liability. In order to state a claim for IIED, the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s “actions are of such a nature as to be considered outrageous and intolerable in that they offend against the generally accepted standards of decency and morality.” Mackey v. Krause, 2025 UT 37, ¶ 86, ---P.3d---. “It is difficult to satisfy the ‘outrageous conduct’ element,” which requires “extraordinarily vile conduct, conduct that is atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Id. ¶ 87 (citation omitted). Applying this outrageous conduct standard to allegations that a defendant falsely published statements that a teacher (1) threw a rock at a student, striking the student on the stomach and (2) threw a student across the room into a wall, the Utah Supreme Court recently held that, as a matter of law, these allegedly false publications did not meet the “high bar” for outrageous conduct to support an IIED claim. Id. ¶ 93; accord Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 70 P.3d 17, 31 (Utah 2003) (affirming dismissal of IIED claim because allegations of abusive litigation tactics were not sufficiently outrageous or intolerable); Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 21 P.3d 198, 207 (Utah 2001) (affirming dismissal of IIED claim because an allegation that a church referred a parishioner to an unlicensed counselor was not sufficiently outrageous or intolerable).

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In this case, the defendants published opinions about higher-ups seeming to get away with murder and that it was surreal for Kubler to finally see Lichfield in person in light of “the children he abused, the parents he conned, all of the crimes he’s gotten away with.” These assertions of opinion are milder than the specific allegations of abuse in Mackey. Thus, Lichfield’s IIED claim similarly fails to clear the “high bar” for outrageous conduct. The court, therefore, dismisses the IIED claim for this additional reason.

E. Civil Conspiracy

“To prove civil conspiracy, five elements must be shown: ‘(1) a combination of two or more persons, (2) an object to be accomplished, (3) a meeting of the minds on the object or course of action, (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts, and (5) damages as a proximate result thereof.’ ” Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1290 n.17 (Utah 1993). Lichfield based his civil conspiracy claim on the alleged unlawful acts of defamation and portraying him in a false light. Because these claims fail as a matter of law, Lichfield cannot satisfy the unlawful acts element. Accordingly, the court dismisses the civil conspiracy claim as well.

II. MOTION FOR ANTI-SLAPP RELIEF

In addition to their motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the defendants also move to strike Lichfield’s action under California’s Anti-SLAPP statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b), or, in the alternative, to dismiss the action under Utah’s UPEPA, Utah Code § 78B-25-103. The defendants assert that California’s statute should control this analysis, while Lichfield argues that the court should apply Utah’s statute.

In diversity jurisdiction cases, federal courts apply the forum state’s choice-of-law rules. Gorsuch, Ltd., B.C. v. Wells Fargo Nat. Bank Ass’n, 771 F.3d 1230, 1236 n.7 (10th Cir. 2014). Under Utah law, courts typically first determine whether there is a meaningful difference between the relevant laws of the different states before engaging in a choice of law analysis. Volonte v. Domo, Inc., 528 P.3d 327, 339 (Utah Ct. App. 2023). Because, as discussed below, the outcome of the defendants’ motion is the same under either the California or the Utah statute, the court need not engage in a choice of law analysis at this juncture.

In determining whether to grant a motion to strike or to dismiss under either state’s Anti-SLAPP statute, the court must first determine whether the statute applies to the plaintiff’s claims. Serova v. Sony Music Entm’t, 515 P.3d 1, 8 (Cal. 2022) (holding that a court must first determine whether California’s anti-SLAPP statute applies); Mackey v. Krause, 2025 UT 37, ¶ 38 ---P.3d--- (holding that the first step of analyzing a motion to dismiss under UPEPA “requires the court to determine whether UPEPA applies to all or part of the challenged causes of action”). California’s statute applies if the conduct that forms the basis of the Lichfield’s claims furthers the exercise of the defendants’ free speech rights “in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(e). Similarly, Utah’s statute applies to Lichfield’s claims if they are based on the defendants’ exercise of free speech “on a matter of public concern.” Utah Code § 78B-25-102(2)(c).

There is no real difference (or at least no difference that matters in this case) between the California and Utah standards for determining the applicability of the relevant Anti-SLAPP statute. The defendants have satisfied both standards. The Tenth Circuit has found that “it is clear that there exists a public controversy as to the most effective method of treating at-risk teenagers.” World Wide Ass’n of Specialty Programs v. Pure, Inc., 450 F.3d 1132, 1137 (10th Cir. 2006). And one district court has specifically found that “the licensing and use of private for-profit teen rehabilitation programs ... is an issue of public interest” under the California standard. Diamond Ranch Acad., Inc. v. Filer, No. 2:14-cv-751-TC, 2016 WL 633351, at PAGE_6 (D. Utah Feb. 17, 2016). Moreover, anther court in this district analyzed the “matter of public concern” standard under Utah’s UPEPA and found that a troubled teen facility’s “actions, business model, tactics, and treatment of vulnerable populations are matters of public concern, as is evident from the repeated news coverage, public documentaries, and recent legislation related to alleged past abuses at” the facility. UHS of Provo Canyon, Inc. v. Bliss, No. 2:24-cv-163-DAK-CMR, 2024 WL 4279243, at PAGE_5 (D. Utah Sept. 24, 2024). The court finds these cases to be persuasive. Under the standard applicable to either California’s Anti-SLAPP statute or Utah’s UPEPA, the statements and alleged inferences that form the basis of Lichfield’s claims involve both an “an issue of public interest” and “a matter of public concern.” Accordingly, both statutes apply to the claims in this action. fn2

fn2. Although Lichfield argued that Kubler’s speech did not touch on a matter of public concern in his briefing, he conceded at oral argument that it did.

PAGE_10

Under both the California and Utah statutes, courts employ the traditional Rule 12(b)(6) standard to determine whether to grant the motion to strike or to dismiss. Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Ctr. for Med. Progress, 890 F.3d 828, 834 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[W]hen an anti-SLAPP motion to strike challenges only the legal sufficiency of a claim, a district court should apply the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard and consider whether a claim is properly stated.”); Utah Code § 78B-25-107(1)(c)(ii) (providing that a court shall dismiss an action under the UPEPA if “the moving party establishes that ... the responding party failed to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted”). Thus, for the same reasons that the court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court also grants the defendants’ motion under California’s Anti-SLAPP statute and Utah’s UPEPA.

Because the defendants prevailed on their Anti-SLAPP motion, they are entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(c)(1) (“[A] prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover that defendant’s attorney’s fees and costs.”); Utah Code § 78B-25-110 (“[T]he court shall award court costs, reasonable attorney fees, and reasonable litigation expenses related to the motion ... to the moving party if the moving party prevails on the motion.”). The defendants may file a motion for fees and costs that specifies the amount requested.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

The court grants the defendants’ motion (1) to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and (2) to strike under California’s Anti-SLAPP statute or to dismiss under Utah’s UPEPA. Accordingly, the court grants the defendants’ request for reasonable attorney fees and costs for bringing its motion.

Lichfield v. Kubler, 2026 WL 2755673 (D.Utah, September 17, 2026).

United States District Court, D. Utah.

NARVIN LICHFIELD, Plaintiff,

v.

KATHERINE KUBLER and NETFLIX, INC., Defendants.

Case No. 2:24-cv-00458-JNP

Filed 09/17/2026

Attorneys and Law Firms

Sarah Spitzer, Michael K. Hepworth, Hepworth & Associates, Bountiful, UT, for Plaintiff.

David W. Tufts, Ian Kinghorn, Dentons Durham Jones & Pinegar PC, Salt Lake City, UT, Jacqueline A. Giannini, Pro Hac Vice, Gregory R. Naron, Pro Hac Vice, Natalie J. Spears, Pro Hac Vice, Dentons US LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES

Jill N. Parrish Chief District Court Judge

• 1

Narvin Lichfield sued Katherine Kubler and Netflix, Inc. (collectively, the defendants), alleging that a documentary series created by Kubler and streamed on Netflix defamed him. The court determined that the defendants were entitled to relief under both the California Anti-SLAPP Act, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b), and the Utah Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA), Utah Code § 78B-25-103, and dismissed the action. Now before the court is the defendants’ motion for an attorney fee award in the amount of $387,712.50 pursuant to both the California Anti-SLAPP statute and Utah's UPEPA. ECF No. 52. The motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Rather than the full amount requested by the defendants, the court awards attorney fees in the amount of $160,000.

BACKGROUND

Both California's Anti-SLAPP Act and Utah's UPEPA are designed to safeguard free speech rights by creating a special procedure to dispose of meritless lawsuits that chill the exercise of those rights. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(a)–(b); Utah Code § 78B-25-103. Under California law, this procedure is called a special motion to strike, while under Utah law, it is called a special motion for expedited relief. Id. Asserting that California law controlled, the defendants moved to strike Lichfield's action under that state's Anti-SLAPP Act. Lichfield argued that Utah's UPEPA should be applied instead. Because the court decided that the defendants were entitled to relief under either the California or the Utah statute, the court did not conduct a choice of law analysis to determine which state's law to apply.

Under both the California and Utah statutes, defendants who prevail on a special motion to strike or a special motion for expedited relief are entitled to recover attorney fees and costs related to the motion. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(c)(1); Utah Code § 78B-25-110. Arguing that they are entitled to an attorney fee award under either statute, the defendants filed the instant fee motion. They request an award of $356,418.50 for work related to their motion to strike (or, alternatively, motion for expedited relief) and $31,294 for work related to the fee motion and reply brief. A total of five attorneys worked on the defendants’ motion to strike and motion for attorney fees. Three attorneys are based in Chicago and billed their time at the rates of $865, $725, and $695 per hour. The Chicago attorneys performed the lion's share of the work in this case. Because none of the Chicago attorneys is a member of the Utah bar, this court's local rules required the defendants to retain local counsel as well. In compliance with this rule, two attorneys based in Salt Lake City appeared in this action and billed their time at $795 and $460 per hour. The defendants did not break down the total number of hours that each attorney billed. Instead, they represented that their attorneys billed a total of 491.8 hours on work related to the motion to strike and 42 hours on work related to the fee motion.

• 2

Lichfield does not dispute that the California and Utah statutes normally mandate an award of fees to defendants that prevail on a motion to strike or a motion for expedited relief. He argues, however, that the court should either deny the fee request in its entirety or reduce the amount of any award because the defendants have not shown that their fee request is reasonable.

CHOICE OF LAW

In diversity jurisdiction cases, federal courts apply the forum state's choice-of-law rules. Gorsuch, Ltd., B.C. v. Wells Fargo Nat. Bank Ass'n, 771 F.3d 1230, 1236 n.7 (10th Cir. 2014). Under Utah law, courts typically determine first whether there is a meaningful difference between the relevant laws of the different states before engaging in a choice of law analysis. Volonte v. Domo, Inc., 528 P.3d 327, 339 (Utah Ct. App. 2023).

Litchfield does not dispute that the attorney hours that form the basis of the defendants’ fee request fall within the scope of both the California and Utah Anti-SLAPP statutes. See S. B. Beach Props. v. Berti, 138 P.3d 713, 717 (Cal. 2006) (“the fee ‘provision applies only to the motion to strike, and not to the entire action.’ ” (citation omitted)); Aston v. Chronicle-Progress LLC, 587 P.3d 981, 990 (Utah 2026) (“[C]ourts must award fees to UPEPA defendants who prevail on a special motion, but the award must be reasonably necessary to prosecute that motion.”). Instead, he argues that the fee amount requested by the defendants is not reasonable because the rates charged by the defendants’ attorneys are exorbitant and because the hours billed are excessive. The court finds that there is no meaningful difference between the law of California and the law of Utah regarding the calculation of a reasonable fee that affects the outcome of this attorney fee motion. Accordingly, the court again declines to conduct a choice of law analysis.

ANALYSIS

Courts applying both California and Utah law consider the number of attorney hours reasonably expended and the reasonable hourly billing rate when determining the amount of a reasonable fee award for a defendant who prevails on a motion to strike or motion for expedited relief. Ketchum v. Moses, 17 P.3d 735, 741 (Cal. 2001); Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 990 (Utah 1988) (cited in Aston v. Chronicle-Progress LLC, 587 P.3d 981, 987 (Utah 2026)). Lichfield argues that the fee award requested by the defendants is not reasonable because their counsel billed too many hours at rates that were too high.

I. REASONABLE HOURLY RATE

The defendants argue that the reasonable hourly rates for the work performed in this case are the rates charged by their attorneys. Lichfield contends that a reasonable rate would be in the neighborhood of $335 per hour. The court rejects both of these proposed hourly rate structures.

First, the court may not consider the rates charged by the defendants’ Chicago attorneys to determine the reasonable rate for this case. Under both California and Utah law, the reasonable hourly rate is typically calculated in accord with the prevailing rate in the local community where the case was litigated. PLCM Grp. v. Drexler, 997 P.2d 511, 518 (Cal. 2000) (“The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.”); Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 990 (Utah 1988) (holding that one of the relevant questions when determining a reasonable attorney fee award is: “Is the attorney's billing rate consistent with the rates customarily charged in the locality for similar services?”). But in exceptional cases where local counsel is unavailable for the type of litigation at issue, courts have discretion to consider out-of-town hourly rates. Rey v. Madera Unified Sch. Dist., 203 Cal. App. 4th 1223, 1241 (2012); Gilbert Dev. Corp. v. Wardley Corp., 246 P.3d 131, 150 (Utah Ct. App. 2010). Here, the defendants argue that because Lichfield chose to sue a large company with a national reach, he cannot complain when that company hires counsel outside of Salt Lake City. But the defendants do not cite any authority for the proposition that litigants who sue large companies may be subjected to higher attorney fee awards based on an international corporation's ability to retain more expensive counsel located in other communities. Nor do the defendants argue that they were unable to find Salt Lake City counsel to adequately litigate the Utah state-law claims asserted by Lichfield. Because the defendants have not even attempted to satisfy the standard for receiving an attorney fee award based on out-of-town hourly rates, the court will not consider the rates charged by their Chicago attorneys when fixing a reasonable hourly rate for this case.

• 3

That leaves the rates charged by the defendants’ local counsel—$795 per hour for the chair of an established Salt Lake City law firm's commercial litigation practice group with over 30 years of experience and $460 per hour for a mid-level associate at that firm—as the two remaining data points proffered by the defendants for determining a reasonable hourly rate for Salt Lake City. The court finds the rate charged by the senior partner to be high. The court does not question this attorney's ability to command this hourly rate or his legal acumen. But the question before the court is not whether the prevailing party's attorney is worth his or her billing rate. Because the party on the losing end of an attorney fee motion does not get to determine whom the opposing party retains as counsel, courts do not simply adopt the billing rates of the attorneys for the prevailing party. fn1 Instead, courts must answer the more abstract question of what the reasonable rate is in the community for the type of work performed. PLCM Grp., 997 P.2d at 518; Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 990. The court finds that the $795 per hour rate charged by the head of the commercial litigation practice group for a prominent local firm is higher than the reasonable rate for a defamation case in the Salt Lake City legal community.

fn1. In this case, moreover, local counsel performed only a small fraction of the legal work for which the defendants seek attorney fees.

The data upon which Lichfield relies to support his proposed reasonable rate is also flawed. He attached to his response brief a “Legal Trends Report” published by a company that sells AI software to lawyers. This report contains a chart that purports to list the average hourly rate for attorneys in each state. The chart indicates that the average rate for Utah is $335 per hour. But this hourly rate is for the state as a whole rather than the relevant legal community: Salt Lake City. Moreover, the Legal Trends Report rate does not differentiate between different practice areas. Lichfield's defamation claims raised thorny constitutional issues, which tend to require attorneys who bill at higher-than-average rates. Thus, while the court may consider the average hourly rate for Utah listed in the Legal Trends Report, the court declines to adopt the $335 per hour rate requested by Lichfield.

With the limited information before it, the court determines that $500 is a reasonable hourly rate in the Salt Lake City legal community for the type of work performed by the defendants’ attorneys in this case.

II. REASONABLE NUMBER OF HOURS EXPENDED

The defendants’ attorneys billed 491.8 hours for work related to the motion to strike and 42 hours for work related to the fee motion, fn2 for a total of 533.8 hours. Lichfield argues that the hours billed in this case are excessive, asserting that (1) the case was overstaffed, resulting in duplicative work, (2) the defendants’ attorneys spent too much time on routine tasks and engaged in block billing, and (3) the defendants billed an excessive amount of time for legal research.

fn2. Both California and Utah courts award fees for bringing a fee motion after a defendant prevails on an anti-SLAPP motion. Ketchum v. Moses, 17 P.3d 735, 747–48 (Cal. 2001); Aston v. Chronicle-Progress LLC, 587 P.3d 981, 989–90 (Utah 2026).

Lichfield has not convinced the court that his second and third arguments merit a reduction from the hours billed. But the court agrees that the defendants’ attorneys billed more than a reasonable number of hours due to the number of attorneys who worked on the case. A total of five attorneys performed work related to the defendants’ motion to strike and attorney fee motion, leading to a considerable duplication of effort. For example, at least four of the defendants’ lawyers billed for time spent watching the Netflix documentary that was the subject of this lawsuit. The defendants’ lawyers also billed a considerable amount of time for communicating with each other and coordinating their efforts. Multiple lawyers billed time for drafting emails, memos, charts, research summaries, and outlines that other lawyers then spent time reviewing. The defendants’ attorneys also spent time in meetings and conference calls with each other. Finally, drafts of court filings were reviewed by multiple attorneys. The court finds that this redundancy in effort increased the total amount of time billed for tasks that could have been performed more efficiently by one or two lawyers. The court also independently notes that 533.8 hours billed for a single motion to strike and a related motion for attorney fees (over three months of work for an attorney to dedicate to a single matter) appears to be more than what would be reasonably required for this case.

• 4

Thus, the court determines that a reasonable number of hours to produce the motion to strike and the motion for attorney fees in this case is fewer than the number of hours that the defendants’ lawyers billed. The only question remaining is how much of a reduction to make. To resolve this question, the court is not required to comb through the billing records line-by-line. “[T]rial courts need not, and indeed should not, become green-eyeshade accountants. The essential goal in shifting fees (to either party) is to do rough justice, not to achieve auditing perfection.” Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011). Rough justice is satisfied by reducing the total number of hours billed (533.8) by approximately 40% to account for the duplication of effort on the part of the defendants’ attorneys. Therefore, a reasonable number of attorney hours required to litigate the defendants’ motions comes to 320.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the court finds that a reasonable hourly rate in this case is $500 and that a reasonable number of hours to litigate the relevant motions is 320. Accordingly, a reasonable attorney fee award is $160,000. The court grants in part and denies in part the defendants’ fee motion and awards this amount, rather than the amount that they had requested.